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statute did not depend on the sponsor's consent to the licensee to drive
on any particular occasion.
A New York statute49 imputes the negligence of the driver to the
owner of the car if the driver was driving with the owner's permission.
This statute imposes an agency relationship on the owner and operator
where there was none at common law, irrespective of family relationship or the age of the operator. Under the New York law the result in
the Roland case would have been different and it seems preferable to
place the loss on the one who has placed the car in the minor's hands
rather than on the signor who has no control over a situation such as that.

A PERSPECTIVE ON NON-LEGAL SOCIAL CONTROLS:
THE SANCTIONS OF SHAME AND GUILT IN
REPRESENTATIVE CULTURAL SETTINGS
INTRODUCTION

Particular modes of behavior tend to characterize any human community and distinguish it from all others. The observation that "morals
are relative" is familiar enough, but disapproval of conduct in one society
that merits praise in others is not the only factor making a group unique.
Certain mannerisms and patterns of behavior simply remain outside the
moral code or customs of any one society for the reason that it would
seldom occur to its members to act differently, or at the very least, they
would have no difficulty resolving the question if faced with a choice
between the accepted way and possible alternatives. Folkways in this
category (shaving the face and not the scalp, rather than the reverse,
would be an instance, as would the use of eating utensils) are wholly accepted by the community and are contravened by virtually no one in it
because there is no strong motivation to induce an alien course of action.
Murder, theft, rape and adultery, on the other hand, are examples of
behavior which at times have motivational roots deeply embedded in biological or psychological bases, and as might be expected, are inclined to
manifest themselves in every society to some extent.
Of the behavior patterns actually found in a community, it may be
said that they are either "sanctioned" or that they are not. In its technical usage unsanctioned behavior, contrary to appearances, does not signify disapprovalof a particular act by the group, but rather indifference:
49.
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the act fails to elicit a response of any description from it. Sanctioned
behavior is that which causes members of the community, or functionaries
in whom authority is vested, to react-whether the reaction be for or
against-thus tending to encourage or discourage the behavior in question. Positive sanctions may generally be said to express the approval
of the community for the performance of expected duties, the fulfillment
of obligations, attempting to live up to or surpassing norms of conduct
the group regards as ideal, or even refraining from reprehensible deeds.
Positive sanctions customarily depend on some sort of reward, the bestowal of rights and privileges, or the acquisition of prestige for their
effect. Negative sanctions, conversely, are reactions of reprobation on
the part of the community toward the conduct of one or more individuals, which conduct may consist of socially disapproved acts or, alternately, a failure to act positively in adhering to rules or discharging
duties or obligations imposed by the community. Negative sanctions as
a rule take the form of punishments, penalties, the denial of rights and
privileges, or the loss in some manner of prestige, rank or status. Sanctions may be expressed with varying degrees of intensity, depending on
how strongly the society, or segments of it, feel about the particular behavior. Members of the community may register their approval or disapproval spontaneously as individuals, or may follow traditional and
recognized procedures. Or, authority to act in behalf of the community
may be placed in the hands of certain persons or with special institutions.
Sanctions imposed by such constituted authorities, whether political, military or ecclesiastic, are designated legal sanctions.1 To the extent and in
the ways sanctions are employed, conduct of the individual is regulated
and conformity to the established social pattern is maintained.
Sanctions appear to arise in response to a need felt by the community
to enforce throughout the entire group notions collectively held concerning what is desirable and what is undesirable behavior. The unity and
even the perpetuation of the group would seem to be founded, at least in
part, in its members sharing the same or essentially the same credo.2
1. XIII ENcyc. Soc. Sci., Sanction, Social 531-34.
2. ". . . [lit is not the effects of the sanction upon the person to whom they are
applied that are most important but rather the general effects within the community
applying the sanctions. For the application of any sanction is a direct affirmation of
social sentiments by the community and thereby constitutes an important, possibly essential, mechanism for maintaining these sentiments. Organized negative sanctions in particular, and to a great extent the secondary sanctions [those which enforce "rights"
between individuals, rights such as are found in modern property, tort or contract law],
are the expression of a condition of social dysphoria brought about by some deed. The
function of the sanction is to restore the social euphoria by giving definite collective
expression to the sentiments which have been affected by the deed . . . or by removing
a conflict within the community itself. The sanctions are thus of primary significance
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Small social groups, whose relationships do not extend far and which
are not complex, are able to achieve the measure of conformity and control necessary to all communities without resorting to the use of legal
sanctions. Hoebel has set forth a comprehensive statement of the reasons for this.'
The informal, or non-legal, mechanisms of social control-wifth an
especial emphasis on the sanctions of shame and its parallel, ridicule, plus
consideration of their counterpart, guilt, where appropriate-will be the
primary focal point of this investigation, both in societies which rely on
them almost exclusively and in those where they are employed merely as
a supplement to legal sanctions. A greater understanding of the nature
and limitations of social control, and of particular means typically employed to attain that end, may be afforded by proper consideration of
the non-legal sanctions in their wider perspective-in their complementary or supplementary role with respect to the legal or authoritarian sanctions. With this prospect in mind, it is proposed first of all to conclude
this introduction by reviewing a number of theoretical formulations suggested by recent psychological inquiries regarding the impact of shame
and guilt sanctions on the individual. Whatever insight provided by
these researches into the reasons behind the unquestionably potent effect
informal sanctions appear to have in molding human behavior may be of
some use in evaluating the empirical materials presented in sections following immediately thereafter. This latter information has been largely
extracted from reports prepared by field investigators, and the intent here
is to disclose a sufficiently detailed view of the modus operandi of nonlegal sanctions that their resultant translation into an astonishing degree
. . . in that they are reactions on the part of a community to events affecting its integration." Id. at 533-34.
3. "As for law, simple societies need little of it. If the more primitive societies
are more lawless than the more civilized, it is not in the sense that they are ipso facto
more disorderly; quite on the contrary. It is because they are more homogeneous; relations are more direct and intimate; interests are shared by all in a solid commonality;
and there are fewer things to quarrel about . . . [that] informal mechanisms of social
control are more generally effective. Precisely as a society acquires a more complex
culture and moves into civilization, opposite conditions come into play. Homogeneity
gives way to heterogeneity. Common interests shrink in relation to special interests.
Face-to-face relations exist not between all the members of the society but only among
a progressively smaller proportion of them. Genealogical kinship links not all the members as it did heretofore but only a progressively smaller proportion of them. Access to
material goods becomes more and more indirect, with greater possibilities for uneven
allocation, and the struggle among the members of a given society for access to the
available goods becomes intensified. Everything moves to increase the potentialities for
conflict within the society. The need for explicit controls becomes increasingly greater.
The paradox (albeit only a paradox for those who unwittingly assume that civilized
people are more moral than uncivilized) is that the more civilized man becomes, the
greater is man's need for law, and the more law he creates. Law is but a response to
social needs." HOEBEL, THE LAw OF PRI ITIVE MAN 98.

NOTES
of social conformity in the selected cultural areas may be rendered intelligible.
The feelings of shame and guilt brought on by certain acts, or even
thoughts, are universally acknowledged to have a powerful influence on
the behavior of human beings, both as a goad to particular kinds of activity and as a deterrent to other kinds. There seems to be little question
but that for this reason they are looked to by many social groups to do
the serious work of enforcing conformity, yielding up a considerable
part of this task to legal sanctions only under the impersonal conditions
encountered in civilization or in otherwise heavily populated areas. (As
we shall see, however, the sanctions of shame and ridicule have remained
unusually effective far into the advanced stages of civilization and dense
population in at least one major instance, that of Japan, due to unique
circumstances there.)
It has been customary until quite recently for anthropologists to
classify human societies as "guilt cultures" or "shame cultures," depending on whether the emphasis of the non-legal sanctions in a particular
culture tended to be such that the individual transgressor of its mores felt
a sense of "guilt" rather than a sense of "shame" upon completing his
antisocial deed or thinking his antisocial thought. The usual way of describing how shame and guilt function as social sanctions was to say that
one who was motivated by feelings of shame was hypersensitive to the
opinions of others and oriented his conduct almost entirely so that he
would receive only praise from them, and never condemnation-which
was emotionally intolerable to him-while on the other hand the guiltridden person had all his standards of propriety and impropriety instilled
firmly within himself, presumably in childhood, and almost always referred to them when contemplating a particular course of action rather
than try to make an estimate of what his associates would think of the
act. Both want to do the "right" thing: the former thinks that what
other people think is right is right; the latter "doesn't care what others
think," he knows his principles will guide him along the path of righteousness. When the shame-driven individual misestimates others' reactions,
or is compelled by some other more powerful psychological drive to do
what he knows will be condemned, and is in fact soundly derided, he feels
"ashamed" of himself; when the guilt-ridden person transgresses his inner principles, usually because of the overwhelming force of some con-

200
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flicting need of the psyche, he feels "guilty."4
The intrapsychic processes which, when subjected to appropriate
conditioning influences, produce character structures typically found in
the respective shame and guilt cultures may be said to function in somewhat the following manner, according to the conventional explanation as
related by Piers:
. . . guilt feeling requires the formation of a Super-Ego . . .
and consequently, it belongs to a comparatively late stage. The
dynamic requisite for shame is merely that the process of Egofinding be under way. Shame has much to do with body function and body performance as such; guilt requires another object-that, too, speaks for a later development of guilt. Comparison with others and awareness of "inferiority" must occur
quite early, most probably earlier than any guilt feelings can
4. One who is shame-sensitive has an advantage over his guilt-motivated cousin: he
is safe until someone learns of his misdeed-if he "gets away with it" he has no reason to
feel shame. The other, however, feels guilty even if he is not caught. He has sinned
and he can not keep it from his "conscience" even if he can keep it from the rest of the
world. It may be noted, on the other hand, that guilt has compensations of which shame
cannot boast: one with pangs of conscience can have his psychic burden removed by
simply confessing his evil deed or thought-to a religious functionary if his internalized
sanctions came from that source, or even to secular parties such as psychiatrists (but
often baring one's soul to mere casual acquaintances will do) if the moral training was
of unspecific origin, but he who is shamed must carry his shame with him. He always
knows that others know of his humiliating behavior, and must live in mortification of
the knowledge-unless by chance he is able to redeem himself in the eyes of others by
doing something they highly approve of, and thus help them forget the time he revealed
what a loathsome, detestable person he was, by demonstrating on the contrary what a
noble, sterling fellow he in fact is. (Most "shame cultures" make some such provision
for unburdening the feeling of shame. If they did not it is expected that private accumulations of shame would become socially disruptive, perhaps culminating in mass
suicides, suicides being frequent enough in such places and mainly because of overdoses
of shame. And, too, making it possible to start with a clean slate by doing praiseworthy acts promotes another aim of the society and of sanctions in general: encouraging desirable behavior.) But it must be said of "guilt cultures," that it not be made to
appear that they possess an unfair advantage of some sort over "shame cultures," that
most people in them never do get rid of all their guilt feelings (or a generalized sense
of guilt without rational basis, which endows the individuals in question with an unconscious craving for punishment), and thus continually manifest outwardly the anxieties
and tensions by which such psychologically injurious phenomena may be recognized.
The reasoning back of this may be described briefly as follows: along with all the
other moral baggage acquired in the childhood of most individuals come prohibitions
against the expression of impulses-such as those of aggressiveness and destructiveness,
as well as the familiar sex impulses-which are instincts quite as natural to the makeup of man as are any of his physiological or physical characteristics. Guilt-ridden persons are taught in their nonage not simply that these impulses ought to be controlled
since uncontrolled they are not useful and may actually work to one's disadvantage
in human society-quite unlike their alleged usefulness to man in his primordial,
simiad state-but rather that such psychic propensities are "evil" and something to feel
guilty about. The impulses cannot be gotten rid of, so the guilt stays on ad infinitum.

NOTES
have developed.'
Dr. Piers substantiates this view by reference to authorities such as
Erikson, who, in his comprehensive Ego-development scheme, relates that
shame (which he associates with "Doubt") is the "specific obstacle in
the task of first establishing . . . 'autonomy.' "'

"Visual shame pre-

cedes auditory guilt."' And in personal communications with other experts on early development (E. Sylvester, H. Ross and Th. Benedek),
he learns that their view is much the same:
. . . shame must be based on that particular form of anxiety
that comes about when the original unit with mother is first
broken, the child starts to walk away and master the environment on his own. He has to learn how to depend on "long
distance" directions from the parent conveyed through auditory
and visual rather than through the more primitive contact
senses. The important signals cease to arise directly from
within the original mother-child unit, but come from another
person, a "watcher" and "caller."'
It may therefore be useful to characterize the Super-Ego as the repository of conditioned responses brought about by the reaction of parents or parental images to the child's behavior, in reference to which the
child will subsequently respond in analogous situations. The Ego-Ideal,
on the other hand, represents the later accumulation of moral standards
and identifications which come largely from peer groups-siblings, childhood "gangs," schoolmates, professional group and social class-even
though, as mentioned previously, conditioning for this receives its initial
impetus from the mother at a very early age. It would thus appear that
there is little difference between the two concepts, but actually a significant distinction is to be found and that is in the nature of the threats
posed to the individual contravening the standards he has in one way or
another absorbed from the external world. The real or imaginary threats
to which he responds for transgressing the mandates of the Super-Ego
are those of mutilation or annihilation, i.e., the punishing aspects, the
wrath, of the parental images. The basis for this is the "Law of Talion,"
or the allegedly universal principle of retaliation-"an eye for an eye,
and a tooth for a tooth." The individual comes to the awareness, ir5. PIERS
STUDY 30.

AND SINGER, SHAME AND

6. Ibid.
7. Id. at 31 ;
8.

Id. at 31.
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rationally and perhaps only unconsciously, that for expressing-or even
acknowledging-his partially muted, inborn impulses toward aggression,
destruction or incest, that mutilation, annihilation or castration in return
will be his just desert. In fact, what takes place is that in accordance
with the principle of projection, he tends to "project" his own primitive,
destructive impulses into another, and so sees that other as he himself
actually is. Thus it follows that without a punitive parent-image, based
either on historical reality or projective imagination, and which plays
such a large part in the formation of the Super-Ego, no one develops a
sense of guilt.9 The threats held out by the Ego-Ideal, that is, shame,
are of an entirely different sort:
Shame . . . occurs whenever goals and images presented by
the Ego-Ideal are not reached. . . . Behind the feeling of
shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the fear of contempt
which, on an even deeper level of the unconscious, spells fear of
abandonment, the death by emotional starvation. The parent
who uses as educational tools the frequent exposure of the
child's immaturity . . . will be the one to lay the foundation
of such fear of contempt. We suspect, however, that the
deeper rooted shame anxiety is based on the fear of the parent
who walks away "in disgust," and that this anxiety in turn
draws its terror from the earlier established and probably
ubiquital separation anxiety.
Withdrawal of love can be a threat only from positive
images. It is as if the loved parental images, or the projected
power and life sustaining sources of one's own [feelings of]
omnipotence threaten to abandon the weakling who fails to
reach them. Accordingly, on a higher, social and more conscious level of individual development, it is not fear of active
punishment by superiors which is implied in shame anxiety, but
social expulsion, like ostracism. . . . [I]t is not the malevolently destructive eye [i.e., "evil eye"], but the all-seeing, allknowing eye which is feared in the condition of shame, God's
eye which reveals all shortcomings of mankind."0
The foregoing seems clear enough, and is in all probability more
than adequate for our purposes. Unfortunately, however, the simplicity
of the analysis outlined above may lure the unsuspecting into thinking
that all the literature on this subject exhibits the same comforting recon9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 16-17.

NOTES
cilability. Nothing could be more misleading: the entire body of treatises and references is replete with conflict and conceptual disaccord.
There is, for example, the widely adopted position that what differentiates shame from guilt is that the former arises in response to "external"
sanctions, i.e., society reacts to the individual's behavior, shaming him,
whereas the latter is the result of "internal" sanctions, by which is meant
the individual looks only to his own inner moral code as a measure of his
conduct or thoughts-if he violates those standards, he feels guilty. But
several investigators have hopelessly confounded this theoretical distinction by describing the existence of a phenomenon designated by them as
"internalized shame,""1 in which the subject's behavior is oriented by an
"eidetic," or fantasy, audience. 2 Internal shame, in other words, is the
feeling of shame that a person, knowing how others would respond if
they had seen him commit a particular act, experiences exactly as though
the others had in fact witnessed it. Presumably, this occurs as a conditioned response, the response of shame (or fear of rejection by society)
having been conditioned to the act itself, irrespective of the actual presence or absence of an audience.
Other disquieting elements should be noted in passing to emphasize
the doctrinally untidy state of affairs here,'" but they need not detain us.
11. "In a recent paper Mead notes that shame has sometimes been 'internalized to
such an extent that an Indian alone in the middle of a lake could be so ashamed by his
paddle breaking that he would commit suicide.'" Id. at 51 quoted from Mead, Collective
Guilt, in PROCEEDINGS, INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MENTAL HEALTH (London 1948).

12. Ibid.
13. Fenichel, for instance, in his book THE PSYCHOANALYTrc THEORY OF NEUROSIS,
insists that "being ashamed of oneself" be classified under the heading of guilt. PIERS
AND SINGER, op. cit. supra note 5 at 9. Reider, on the other hand, contends that shame
is used by some as a defense against a more intolerable sense of guilt. Ibid.; Reider,
The Sense of Shame, 3 SATAIKSA 147 (1950). But Erikson, at least, evidently is not in
full accord with this view: "Shame is an emotion insufficiently studied because in our
civilization it is so early and easily absorbed by guilt." ERIRSON, op. cit. supra note 7 at
223. Dr. Piers, commenting on this analysis, states that the "author distinguishes between these two tensions very clearly . . . ascrib[ing] their respective onset to different
stages of development," despite his subsequent admission that Erikson "prefers to think
of the shame-impulse 'to bury one's face, to sink into the ground' as 'essentially rage
turned against the self' which is an important guilt mechanism." Id. at 9-10. Piers
quotes Franz Alexander as a "good example of both the greatly advanced understanding
and the still remaining unclarity" in the literature on shame and guilt: ". . . in spite
of the fact that in structural terms inferiority feelings and guilt feelings can be described with the same formula as a tension between ego and ego-ideal they are fundamentally different psychological phenomena, and as a rule their dynamic effect upon
behavior is opposite." Dr. Piers concedes, however, that "It would seem almost imperative that emotions phenomenologically and dynamically so different would also differ
structurally." Id. at 10. See also Alexander, Remarks about the Relation of Inferiority
Feelings to Guilt Feelings, 19 INT. J. OF PSA. 41 (1938). On the same point Dr. Piers
in another context states that he prefers "to use the more inclusive term 'shame' rather
than 'inferiority feelings.' The latter term implies comparison with external figures.
. . . [and] does not well describe that particular inner tension which stems from failure
to reach one's own potentialities [ie., failure to bridge the gap between the Ego and the
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Nor do they require us, simply because we are forewarned of the folly
of asserting any one view as incontestable gospel, to consider ourselves
precluded from sifting through the medley of conflicting observations in
an effort to set aside the more dubious claims and, by way of summarizing, focus on those findings which appear not only to be of greater substance, but as well seem more likely to be accommodating to the stated
design of this project. Discarding the "internal-external" criterion,
which appears to be completely devoid of usefulness at this time as an
indicator of shame or guilt, would be an obvious step in this direction.
A phenomenon such as "internalized shame" does not thus loom on the
scene as an anomaly. It is then no more deserving of special comment
than guilt: if it is irrational, in a situation of "internal shame," for an
individual's act to have as great an impact on him as when an actual audience is present, then it is just as "irrational" for him to succumb in utter
resignation to non-existent threats of punishment upon the performance
of certain acts for the sole reason that, years prior, those same acts were
accompanied by actual threats of punishment. The nature of the threats
posed to the individual, that of rejection and abandonment in the case of
shame, and that of punishment, mutilation or annihilation in the case of
guilt, remains as the most serviceable and valid means of classifying these
two entities, and can be applied in the above instance without difficulty.
Further, should a comprehensive rationale eventually be offered for the
occurrences to which a number of authorities have drawn attention-that,
for instance, shame is sometimes transformed into guilt, or is absorbed
by it, or is often set up as a defense to a more intolerable sense of guilt
(see footnote 13)-no obstacle presently discernible would of necessity
disturb this elemental proposition.

Two

PRIMITIVE CULTURE AREAS

It has been the practice until recently, when re-examinations of a
more painstaking character caused serious misgivings about it, to regard
primitive groups, almost without exception, and virtually all the societies
Ego-Ideal by not reaching the goals and living up to the images presented by the latter.]" PIERS AND SINGER, op. cit. supra at 15. In fact, it is not at all evident that the
one term is more appropriate than the other. It is perfectly plausible that a person
could feel as "inferior" about not measuring up to the abstract standards presented to
him by his Ego-Ideal as he does about unfavorable physical comparisons, or comparisons
of performance, with others. If he does not feel "inferior" about inability to live up to
the Ego-Ideal image, what is it that he does feel? In either case it is the threat of rejection that troubles him; why should it matter conceptually whether the image to which
he compares himself is abstract or "real"? The abstract standard, after all, is nothing
more than generalizations distilled down from the entire compass of norms emanating
from the individual's peer groups, thus the distinction between this and specific instances
of comparison with members comprising these groups is largely a semantic one.

NOTES

of Asia as "shame cultures," while restricting the term "guilt culture" to
those of Western Europe and the Americas, that is, the Americas since
the influx of European settlers and European ways. Some have gone
so far as to suggest that the highly individualized sense of guilt prevailing in the latter has been responsible for their "progressiveness," i.e.,
industrialization. The general consensus in Western civilizations that
hard work, thrift and continence are ennobling, when linked with the
uneasy sense of guilt which descends upon a person imbued with the
"Protestant Ethic" should he momentarily backslide into the false ways
of indolence, improvidence and profligacy, makes the perfect setting for
the accumulation of machines and factories. In fact, the process of capital accumulation becomes all but automatic, and perhaps even irreversible.
Thus, to the lack of guilt-feelings and a "conscience" in non-Western
countries may be attributed their obduracy in taking up the call to everincreasing technological mastery of the physical world. A. L. Kroeber
is one among a number who has registered dissent toward this view. In
his book, ANTHROPOLOGY (p. 612), his skepticism is revealed in these
words: "the reputedly independent and separate verdicts of Anglo-Saxon
anthropologists on Asiatic, Oceanic, native American, and African cultures, that shame is a far more influential motivation in them than a sense
of sin, does not really specifically characterize these cultures nearly so
much as its opposite-conscious sinfulness-characterizes Anglo-Saxon
and Protestant culture."'" The outcome of this controversy, however,
need not deter us from actually looking into several culture areas in
which, even if the "shame culture-guilt culture" distinction is not wholly
14. Id. at 46. And Dr. Singer himself stresses that it is not difficult "to point to
many developments of modern history which cast serious doubt on the neat correlations
between shame and guilt mechanisms on the one hand, and the major trends of technical,
social, and moral development on the other. . . . Many progressive changes have oc-

curred and are going on now without the prior or even simultaneous development of the
"Protestant personality": the industrialization of Japan and the more recent beginnings
of the process in India and China. There are nonindustrialized cultures, like that of
Islam, with absolute moral standards, which are effectively enforced for the general
population not by an 'inner voice' but by the pressures of law and public opinion. Within the West itself, the belief in the individualized sense of guilt as the standard bearer
of civilization and progress has been considerably shaken by studies which seek to link
the major pathologies of modern civilization-war, dictatorship, and mental disease-to
the 'heightened sense of guilt.' And some students of the West have discovered the
emergence of a new radar-like mechanism of character formation which functions more
like the group-mindedness of primitive cultures than like the individualized conscience
upon which the West has prided itself." Id. at 46-47. A particularly forceful statement
of the latter point has been made in RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD, A STUDY OF THE
CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER, in which the author elaborates the thesis that the typical American is no longer as "inner-directed," i.e., guided by principles and absolute
standards of morality inculcated on him in his early years, as his forebears were, but is
rather increasingly "other-directed," that is, responsive to the casuistic evaluations of
his associates.
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valid, it is evident at least that public opinion plays a very significant role
in character formation. But before embarking upon a more detailed
examination of shaming practices and institutions in the specific places
that have been singled out for study here, it will be advantageous to
briefly establish the relationship between the use of non-legal sanctions
and the educative process in general. 5
Public shaming and ridicule should be seen in their broader context
as simply one part of the overall educative process undertaken by primitive societies, rather than as isolated, totally unrelated phenomena. Civilized peoples, as well, recognize the necessity of transmitting the established cultural patterns-their traditions, beliefs, ideals and aspirationsto the younger generation if the culture is to survive.'" But there is a
difference in the way the problem is dealt with: anything like school
systems familiar to us appears to be totally lacking among primitives, and
therefore they must resort to other procedures and institutions.' Pettit
warns of drawing the wrong inference from this; indeed, the methods
employed by primitive societies, he feels, are considerably more effective
in attaining educational goals than is a modern school system, which is
often expected to shoulder the entire burden by itself. This is especially
so concerning the vital task of instilling the community's ideals and traditions in the youth, in order that the world view peculiar to the culture
may go on unimpaired from generation to generation.'" His description
of this process in the following passage is particularly illuminating:
. . . primitive education was a community project in which all
15. It should be noted that non-legal sanctions are not unique in this respect. A
number of eminent students of Western judicial institutions have recognized for some
time that courts in our system, particularly appellate courts, are not confined to the functions of resolving disputes and applying the law only, but in addition fulfill a distinctly
educational role in our society. The higher court's almost instinctive reaction to dispose
of cases before them by means of opinions with a pronounced didactic aura about them,
rather than simply deciding the matters without further ado, is rendered more understandable in this light. Of course, there is merit to the contention that appellate courts
ought to demonstrate the logic of what they do, but this proposition does not adequately
treat of the conspicuous moral overtones revealed in these decisions, or of the horatory
mold into which the opinions are cast.
16. "The psychology of the child presents the same social problem to all cultures
. . . [in effect] a ubiquitous factor tending to promote culture parallels and convergences, not to mention influencing culture diffusion." PETTIT, PRIMITIVE EDUCATION IN
NORTH AmERICA 14. "Cultural ideals have changed, but cultural goals fall largely into
the same categories." Id. at 3.
17. Perhaps the situation would be more aptly stated the other way around: the
circumstances of primitive life permit education to be successfully achieved without the
establishment of formal schools.
18. It is his view, however, that this fact may well be turned to our own advantage:
"Through study of such school-free efforts we may obtain a clearer conception of the
manifold ramifications of the process of conditioning children and of safeguarding a
culture pattern."

PrTIT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 3.

NOTES
reputable elders participated at the instigation of individual
families. The result was not merely to focus community attention on the child, but also to make the child's education a constant challenge to the elders to review, analyze, dramatize and
defend their cultural heritage. Their own beliefs, understanding and faith, their personal integration in the culture and their
collective unity, all were promoted by the necessity of assuming
the role of educators of their children. .

.

. In primitive society

the stimulus to elaboration of a culture, to dramatization of
it in the minds of all elders and to strengthening of its historical
and logical plausibility comes more certainly from the children,
who enter the social group as total strangers, than from any
other source. In modern society, perhaps, much of this stimulus is being absorbed by the school system . . .and has become

so highly institutionalized that the need for transmitting culture
to the younger generation is no longer reflected in the culture
as a whole.

.

.

. [T]he gradual concentration of responsi-

bility for education in school systems has led to a sloughing of
responsibility by other agencies...
The situation is significantly different on the primitive
level; for no single institution exists there to meet the educational need. As a result all institutions, or at least the great
majority of them, have to see to their own perpetuation. The
educational role which they play is largely unformulated and
even unconscious, and it is for this reason, perhaps, that its importance has been overlooked. . .

[T]his accessory function

has influenced the character and, not improbably, stimulated
the development of the institutions concerned."9
Not only does the process seem inevitable, but according to Pettit, to
state it solely in terms of an effort to effect cultural transmittal is to do
an injustice to the great vigor and gusto with which the whole enterprise
is undertaken. So much so, indeed, that serious doubt is cast over the
belief that man is by nature a progressive animal, being bent, rather, on
frustrating any conceivable possibilities for change, at least cultural
change."
19. Id. at 3-5.
20.

".

.

. [T]here are many students of anthropology and sociology who admit

that the human mind, protected from distracting environmental changes, seems to exhaust
its ingenuity in mastering and then maintaining the cultural status qto. . . . Cultures

may differ widely, but all must approach each other most closely in education, for the
simple reason that they cannot develop a peculiar kind of infant to fit their needs. They
must take what nature gives them-an infant who is more like all other infants in the
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Perhaps one of the reasons primitive peoples succeed in firmly
implanting in their offspring the community's cherished beliefs and
ideals, whereas we, for example, with our elaborate schools and other
pedagogically oriented institutions often fail so dismally that a typical
end-product of this years-long, compulsory system cannot even formulate
an intelligible account of the basic precepts of the American credo-let
alone develop a cogent defense in their favor21-is that educational
methods adopted by primitives show a high order of sophistication and
ingenuity, if not to say a thorough-going understanding of practical
human psychology, an understanding superior, it has been alleged, to
that demonstrated by modern theories of education.22
This apprehension of preliterate folk for what a society must do to
indoctrinate the younger generation seems to include not only an awareness of the advisability of all adults in the community taking an active
part in the educative process, and of practicing what they preach, but
also the importance of not entrusting education of the children to mere
chance imitation of their elders. Very little is left to either spontaneous
imitation or individual initiative of an experimental variety, though in
the past practically all of the credit for education among primitives had
been erroneously assigned to spontaneous imitation. An elaborate system of rewards and punishments to promote the cultural ideals and behavior recognized as desirable by general consensus of the community,
which at the same time discourages frowned-on activities, will customarworld, psychologically speaking, than like the older individuals of his tribe. Consequently, the provisions for the transmission of culture must be more nearly alike than
the cultures themselves need be. In primitive societies, where the ratio of children to
adults is relatively high, and where no special institution has been devised to assume the
burden of transmitting the culture, transmissibility becomes a factor in practically all
institutions, and gives them a similarity for which it is otherwise difficult to account,
even with the help of the most elaborate theory of borrowing between cultures." Id. at 5.
21. Reference here is made especially to the performance of American prisoners of
war in Korea. It seems to have come as a surprise to most Americans that a fairly
random sampling of their fellow citizens had such an inadequate and nebulous founding
in what our values are and why, that they could, without putting up even token resistance, wilt in the face of an alien idea-system which should have been thoroughly odious
to them. As is well-known, a soul-searching of nationwide proportions ensued. It is
suggested, however, that for the same reason the incident warranted an ideological
stock-taking, afterthoughts about the credentials of these luckless warriors to qualify
as typical representatives of the American citizenry should not have been particularly
comforting.
22. "[W]hat modern psychology has to offer for the educator with respect to the
emotional aspects of the child implies that some at least of the confusions of modern
education derive from departure from or neglect of fundamental facts that primitive
peoples used with effective intensity." PrrriT,op. cit. supra note 16 at 15, quoted from
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, EMOTION AND THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS (Prescott
ed.) 48: "There is probably no method or device known to and practiced by civilized
man which is not known to and practiced by uncivilized man in the social and moral
training of the child." Id. at 15 quoted from Cooper, Child Training Among Prnitive

Peoples, 1
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12 (1928).

NOTES
ily be found in full operation in most preliterate societies. The bestowal
of specific privileges and the imposition of artificial restrictions are expedients extensively relied on, and can readily be identified as the incentives for particular achievements which, they feel, are in the final analysis a measure of maturity. Such devices actually push the child toward
full-fledged adult responsibility; the earlier years are designed quite purposely to be less carefree than they might be in order that the child does
by comparison, making
not see adulthood as something disadvantageous
23
him reluctant to qualify for the new status.
Primitive man appears also to appreciate fully the more fruitful
possibilities of positive sanctions vis-a-vis negative sanctions, in his search
for ways to promote social conformity and make his children more amenable to those ways. Because in all social groups negative sanctions are
more definite than positive ones,24 the temptation is to believe that they
are more effective as well-a view which research has not borne out.
Though the present study is directed primarily at the negative sanctions
of shame, ridicule and guilt, positive sanctions are of such consequence
that to neglect them altogether in a discussion of informal social controls
is to suggest a schema that is somewhat less than authentic. Praise, the
positive counterpart of the negative sanctions of ridicule or condemnation, is especially indicated to receive distinction and precedence as a
technique for effecting social conformity. Primitive man and modern
psychologists are in accord on this. 25
23.

The efficacy of praise can un-

"Childhood was not permitted to be an unadulterated pleasure which the child

would dislike to leave.

Arbitrary restrictions were numerous enough to add tangible

desirability to the acquisition of the skills and status of the mature individual. Moreover, the process of maturation was not only distinguished by the sequential removal of

restrictions, but was also given additional significance by the granting of publicly sanctioned rewards in the form of social privileges, and decorative rights. The primitive
peoples gave more than lip service to the ideals which they sought to inculcate in their

children. Those ideals were recognized in tangible and important ways, and there was
less confusion of purpose generated in the minds of children than is true where achievement of social ideals does not guarantee power, prestige, and other social rewards." Id.
at 57.
24. XIII ENcyc. Soc. Scr., Sanctio, Social 531-34.
25. "[A] reacting audience or environment, one that praises success or condemns
failure, but particularly one that praises success, stimulates learning. Lack of reaction
from the environment has the opposite effect." PETTIT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 47,
quoted from AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, op. cit. supra note 22 at 124. "If any
practice is generally resulting in satisfaction, the practice will be continued. The use of

artificial rewards or punishments merely carries out this idea; it is, in fact, a form of
conditioning. . . . Of the two methods, the reward is more effective. . . ." Ibid. quoted
from JENSEN, PSYCHOLOGY OF CHMD BEHAVIOR 446.

". . . [P]raise seems to precede

ridicule in the life of the Indian child, and take precedence in the reaction of the group
toward the individual. In other words, an ego, like a balloon, must be inflated before
it can be punctured, and must be patched and occasionally reinflated if it is to retain its

vulnerability." Id. at 50. "Primitive man wants, above all, to shine before his fellows;
he craves praise and abhors the loss of 'face.'"

Id. at 47, quoted from LowiE,

ARE

WE

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

210

doubtedly be attributed to the positive, outward-going influence it has in
character formation, as contrasted with the destructive, stultifying effect
negative sanctions often have. Primitive societies value praise more
highly, perhaps simply because this fact is all too evident to them; hence
they employ it if not exclusively, then at least in preference to derision
and detraction. Margaret Mead has illustrated this well in her study of
Manus children:
.

. every gain a child makes in acquiring independence and

dexterity is noted and used as a new basis for further stimulation. Whole groups of busy men and women will stop to encourage a child's first step, but they ignore its first fall. The
only way the child holds an audience is by doing things and trying again. A boy who has been allowed to steer the family
canoe can get it into difficulties without arousing a change of
expression on his father's face, but the moment he succeeds in
getting the canoe out of danger he receives an immediate word
of approval. 6
The foregoing considerations should provide a more adequate basis
for an appreciation of what appears at first glance, to those outside a
particular cultural arena in any event, phenomena of a most bizarre
species, such as the exaggerated sensitivity of individuals who are part
of the primitive community structure to shaming devices, ridicule and
public opinion in general.
Shaming Techniques of North American Indian Groups. Compliance with cultural patterns within the primitive tribes of North America,
according to Pettit, is largely a result of the same mode of dealing with
children as has already been set forth in some detail. From birth on the
child is conditioned to praise and ridicule, often with the willing cooperation of the entire adult community. In effect, there is a socially
recognized ladder of privilege up which the individual climbs to prove he
is progressing toward maturity. Besides the removal of artificial restrictions, there are rewards for advancing up this ladder, such as public
recognition through forms of etiquette, terms of address, titles, precedence in social gatherings, ceremonial homage and styles of address and
adornment. In this, too, primitive societies are not alone, but it is not
156. Pettit adds that perhaps this last statement does civilized man an undeserved slight, but at any rate it points up the peculiar sensitivity of primitives in this
respect, which he feels is more a result of the educational processes employed by them
than of inherent psychological differences. Id. at 47.
26. Id. at 47-48, quoted from MEAD, GRowING UP IN NEW GuINEA 26-30.
CIVILIZED?
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far off the mark to say that they are outstanding in this respect, and are
therefore deserving of study, Pettit thinks, by cultures that by and large
neglect such practices.27
Some of the specific procedures employed by North American Indian groups to bring home to the individual the importance of public
opinion, and to utilize these collective value judgments to maximum advantage for purposes of integration and perpetuation of their respective
cultures, are presented in the following paragraphs:
a) Trivial or ridiculous names were often conferred upon young
children and would not be changed until the individual child had in some
way distinguished himself. These "might be applied just before or at the
beginning of puberty when pressure was being brought upon the individual to assume the responsibilities of maturity. ' 2 '
The nicknames
would call attention to some peculiarity of appearance, behavior or experience.2 ' Even if the youth were as far along in age as the usual onset
of puberty when he first had to contend with the approbrium of such a
nickname, the process of conditioning apparently had progressed to the
point that he did not have to learn further the significance of public
opinion in regulating his life. Indeed, about the Quinault, Olson writes
that "a youth was sometimes so sensitive about his nickname, especially
if he were of high birth, that no one but the professional joker of the
village dared twit him about it.""0 However, the actual pedagogical effectiveness of these names depended ". . . on the opportunities provided
to gain a better name through good behavior or self-development and
personal achievement. . . . [T]here is always the implication with nicknames that the individual overcomes their ridiculousness or triviality by
his own efforts along socially approved lines."'"
The nicknames play an important educational role, as it has before
been intimated, because ". . . primitive society was capable of acting in
unison, and . . . there was little chance of escaping from a sanction set
within the group. Osgood has said of the Kutchin: 'Children who do
not behave are talked about by the whole group. The children do not
like this and often mend their ways.' So long as his parents have not
transgTessed against the code of proper behavior toward children, the
force of social pressure is seldom if ever diluted by non-conforming
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
Washington,

at 48.
at 61.
at 53.
at 61, quoted from OLSoN, THE
6 Publ. in Anthropology No. 1).

31. Id. at 62-63.
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adults or age-mates to whom the transgressor can flee for sympathy or
support."32
b) Generally, the right to ridicule with impunity was limited in
North American primitive tribes. A distinction could usually be made
between sanctioned and unsanctioned ridicule. The reason for the restricted use of ridicule appeared to be the heightened sensitivity of people
to it. Unsanctioned attempts at ridicule tended to end in catastrophe,
e.g., suicide or even murder: "If an antient Man should say to a young
Man, by way of Reproach, before others, Thou Hast No Wit, he would
presently go and poison himself, they are so sensible of Ignominy and
Disgrace."3 " And an Ojibwa man killed the one who had ". . . made a
slighting reference to his nose, even though he knew it was a most peculiar organ, it having been badly chewed in a brawl some years ago.""4
Among the Iroquois ridicule that otherwise might involve considerable risk could become sanctioned when their most popular dance, the
War Dance, was being performed. By making a gift to the dancers one
could then speak for two or three minutes on any subject. He could, as
he chose, sing praises of himself, condemn social transgressors in general
or satirize particular individuals-and seemingly no suicides took place
as a result of the latter. 5
Further indication of the delicate treatment the use of ridicule had
to be accorded might be seen in the tradition of assigning particular individuals, who could in addition be disciplinarians in other matters, to
the task of carrying out ridicule the community felt was necessary.
Quite often these persons were thought to have supernatural protection,
and perhaps this is why they could indulge in what otherwise would be
dangerous mockery. If other-worldly guardians were not relied on in
this way, resort would often be made to concealing the identities of the
principals. The agents of ridicule would be masked or somehow disguised. One of the more amusing instances of this, in which anonymity
was achieved in great numbers, was related by Wissler in his SOCIAL LIFE
OF THE BLACKFOOT INDIANS.

"Caustic remarks about some individual

were shouted at night from inside a tipi on the far side of the great camp
circle and taken up in gleeful chorus by hundreds of voices until the air
reverberated and the victim dared not show his face until he had accom32. Id. at 62, quoted in part from OsGooD, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ETHNOLOGY OF
THE KUTCHIN 147 (Yale Univ., Publ. in Anthropology No. 14).
33. Id. at 50. Stated in reference to the Iroquois, as quoted from HENNEPIN, A
NEW DISCOVERY OF A VAST COUNTRY IN AmERICA 550.
34. Id. at 50-51, as related in TANNER, NARRATIVE OF THE CAPTIVITY AND ADVENTURES OF JOHN TANNER DURING THIRTY YEARS RESIDENCE AMONG THE INDIANS

35.

Id. at 51, taken from MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE IROQUOIS 258.
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plished some great deed to wipe out the disgrace."" In the same tribe,
"An unpopular chief, whom, perhaps, no one dared ridicule to his face,
would be treated to the ignominy, one dark night, of having a frightened
colt, which had been given a sound whack on the hindquarters, headed
into his lodge entrance." 37
c) Primitives, too, have long recognized the influence woman has
had, immemorially, over her menfolk. Accordingly, in certain Indian
tribes the ridicule privilege was theirs- especially the potential wives of
the individuals concerned. "[I] f a Cree youth showed cowardice on a
war party, his best girl composed derisive songs and sang them publicly."3 "Mandan and Hidatsa girls who had won distinction in feminine pursuits would ridicule young men of their age-class who had not
yet won war honors.'3

"Among the Pueblo, boys who went on hunting

trips and came back without any game were jeered at and mocked by the
40
girls."
d) Even ridicule which was not fraught with so many calamitous
consequences was relegated to particular persons in the community. This
was nothing exceptional, however, for most forms of disciplinary practice were the responsibility of someone outside the immediate family
group.

"One fundamental practice of the primitive peoples . . . is to

reserve to those groups intimately concerned with the allegiance of a
youth, the pleasantest educational tasks, and to place the responsibility
for the majority of the unpleasant duties upon some outside individual
or agency. . . It is more correct to say of primitive peoples that parents
avoid disciplining their children if possible, than it is to say that children
are not disciplined [as many observers had previously supposed because
of the conspicuous absence of these activities on the part of the parents]. . .

If there was any recalcitrance to be overcome, the parents

called in a relative or a friend or some warrior or leader to perform the
disagreeable duty."" (Perhaps this is a lesson we would do well to learn
from "uncivilized man," whose understanding of human nature apparently is not fettered by notions of the "rationality" of human beings.
This is especially so in view of the universally acknowledged-and socially
36. Ibid., quoted from this work of Clark Wissler in the Anthropological Papers of

the American Museum of Natural History, No. 7, pt. 1, 24.
37. Ibid., quoted from MCCLINTOCK, THE OLD NORTHTRAIL 298.
38. Ibid., quoted from HARMON, A JOURNAL OF VOYAGES AND TRAVELS

IN THE

IN-

TERIOR OF NORTH AMERICA 308.
39. Ibid., quoted from LowiE, SocrA.L ORGANIZATION AND CULTURE OF THE MANDAN, HIDATSA AND CROW INDIANS 43 (Anthropological Papers of the American Museum

of Natural History No. 21, pt. 1).
40. Ibid., quoted from BANDELIER,
41. Id. at 15.
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disruptive-tendency for deep-seated, though repressed, hostile feelings
to develop in parental-filial relationships-which often even death does
not eradicate.) This "discipline by outsiders," when it is of the derisive,
satirical sort, is so well marked that it is often referred to in anthropological literature as "the joking relationship," but, as Pettit remarks:
No explicit identification of the joking relationship with ridicule as a form of social coercion and stimulus, or more pertinently, as an incentive to learning and achievement, has come
to my attention. This may result from the fact that the comments passed between individuals having this relationship may
be mild and seemingly harmless. It should be remembered that
they gain their force from the previously acquired sensitivity
of the individual, and from the publicity given. It is the
chorus of snickers that greets the jest, and the allusions to it
later, rather than the jest itself, that strikes home.42
Sometimes cousins, either true cousins or clan cousins (children belonging to fathers of the same clan), would have this joking relationship.
"A Mandan or Hidatsa boy who had just achieved a war honor might
publicly give some other boy who was his joking relation a public, humiliating haircut, to stimulate him to do likewise by indicating that so
far he was remiss.

'
43

The "avunculate" relationship often encountered in primitive societies, in which the mother's brother appears to have taken over most of
the responsibilities for raising her (his sister's) children-responsibilities
we normally would expect of the biological father-seems more often
than not to be accompanied by this joking relationship. Pettit therefore
feels that a better view of the avunculate structure is not the traditional
one that saw it as an inevitable result of the kind of provisions for property inheritance usually obtaining in societies based on matrilineal descent-a view which has never been adequately understood, perhaps because of the prejudices of Western investigators who invariably inclined
to focus on the inheritance of property-but rather that it is a natural
concomitant of the educational procedures preferred by primitive peoples. The evidence he adduces to substantiate this cannot be reviewed
here, but would appear to warrant more work along these lines."
e) As the effectiveness of belittling names as an educational incentive, and thus as an instrument of social control, depended on the op42. Id. at 51-52.
43. Id. at 52, quoted from LOWiE, op. cit. supra note 39 at 42-43.
44. Id. at 17-24.
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portunities for their removal through the expiatory procedure of performing laudatory deeds, in like manner did much of the effectiveness of
derisive public opinion derive from the fact that the good graces of the
community could be won back by positive action. An observation made
of tribes of the Northwest Coast may serve to especially stress the point.
There it was noted that an ".

.

. individual takes vigorous steps to wipe

out the disgrace of events which make him a potential butt even though
they are accidental in nature, and regardless of any indication of a public
'
intention to use them as a basis of ridicule."45
f) Not only is the growing child not left to his own devices in acquiring skills that would make him economically self-sufficient (in fact,
even the spur of personal hunger is almost universally avoided in the
training of children), being instead beset with every possible incentive,
both positive and negative,4" but the same approach is taken toward learning the art of war-which, of course, in large part is a matter of survival

as well. "[R]idicule is a strongly emphasized aspect of war training.
Varriors seek to mock the neophyte by treating him as a girl, or by play' 47
ing jokes on him, or making him a servant.
g) Perhaps it cannot be inferred that primitives were aware of the
psychologically unsatisfactory aspects of corporal punishment both in the
socialization of the child and in the regulation of adult behavior, but the
fact remains that they made very little use of it, and when they did, it
seemed to have but little potency compared to the far more effective
techniques they had developed. "The whole control of the local group in
aboriginal days seems to have been exercised by admonition 'and mild
ridicule instead of by force and punishment."4 "Children were taught
that good conduct would earn a reward and evil conduct would bring sorrow . . .a few words of praise from a parent or an elder was regarded

as the highest prize that could be given for good conduct. A child would
strive with all his might to win such praise while he would be indifferent
to bodily punishment. One punishment that was always a bitter one to
an Indian child was to have his faults told to a visitor or friend. '49 "Because the local groups [of the Northwest Coast] themselves are small
kinship bodies they are able to handle their internal personal problems on
other than legal bases. Shaming suffices for this, 'The big stick which
is relied on in this control system [is] not physical punishment, but social
attacks upon the extremely vulnerable egos of the members of the
45. Id. at 53.
46. Id. at 75.
47. Id. at 53 and authorities cited therein.
48. Id. at 50, quoted from WiSSLER, THE AmICANz INDIAN 189.
49. Id. at 49, quoted from ALFORD, CIVILIZATION (As told to Florence Drake) 19-21.
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group.'

"Zuni sanctions are extraordinarily negative, the fear of be-

"0

ing shamed. .

.

. [but] Zuni individuals [are not] controlled by organ-

ized external sanctions, such as execution, banishment, official plunder,

etc.

. . ."

h) Among the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island, where not
only is a "quick reaction to the sentiment of shame" found, but the peculiar institution of the "potlatch" has developed to inordinate proportions, the two may often go hand in hand. By means of "potlatching"the orgiastic destruction or distribution to others of large amounts of
valuable property-ordinarily a man rises in social status or maintains
the social status he already enjoys. But we are informed it can be used
as well to eradicate the humiliation of a shameful situation: "When a
young prince capsized in a canoe, his father felt it necessary to wipe out
the shame of this trivial accident with the distribution of property." 2
i) Shaming is often used to resolve disputes in family relations
and otherwise enforce a society's notions about sexual morality. Where
chastity is highly esteemed, promiscuous wives or even unmarried women are often made the object of derisive abuse. But among the Zuni
even a ".

.

. married man who is promiscuous in his sex relations is

shamed in public by his wife, who chooses some public ceremonial to
make her gesture of disapproval.""3 Or, a man may publicly shame his
wife into giving him a divorce if she otherwise will not. And there was
the case of a man, "who, when he learned that his wife was dancing in
a dance in which only unmarried women may participate, was so ashamed
54
that he did not attend."
j) It is difficult to conceive the expression "dying of shame" as
being anything but figurative, but apparently such a belief would only
serve to illustrate the differing degrees of intensity with which shame is
felt in various cultures.

"On the Northwest Coast . . . an individual

unable to show himself superior to a situation that has shamed him commits suicide or 'dies of shame.' The chief who discovered that his eldest
son had married the common daughter of a youngest son died of shame,
not because the marriage was considered incestuous but because his son
had been tricked into a low marriage."5 5 Moreover, even though one
50. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 316, taken in part from an unpublished
manuscript by Crane, Kwakiutl, Haida and Tshnshia: A Study in Social Control
(University of Utah Library 1951) 144.
51. MEAD (ED.), COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG PRIa[ITIVE PEOPLES 495.
52. Id. at 205, quoted from BoAs, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ETHNOLOGY OF THE
KWAKiUTL 132 (Columbia Univ., Contributions to Anthropology).
53. Id. at 333.
54. Id. at 339.
55. Id. at 206, quoted from BoAs, op. cit. supra note 52 at 412.
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who has undergone an extremely mortifying experience does not "die of
shame" directly, in the sense that the emotional impact is in some
imperfectly understood way psychosomatically fatal, shame may drive
him to the point of taking his life by his own hand. In certain cultures
suicide resulting from shame has developed to such an extent that it is
virtually an institutionalized practice. As such, institutionalized suicide
may often be regarded as a measure of the degree of ego development in
the society, hence as a measure of the responsiveness of the individual to
shaming techniques and their prevalence in the society."
k) Mead states that shame may become internalized when it is very
strongly developed. Speaking of the Ojibwa she reports that ". . . the
group takes a comparatively passive part in defining the situation as
shameful but permits the vulnerable ego of the individual to declare itself shamed before them."57 It is suggested that this is an example of the
confusion still prevalent in the matter of shame and guilt. This would
seem more like atonement by way of public confessional, and Dr. Iead,
by her own words, admits that this is more a characteristic of guilt than
shame: "Guilt . . . represents a disordered state within the psyche
which can be righted only by atonement. . .. In societies in which the
individual is controlled by fear of being shamed, he is safe if no one
knows of his misdeed; he can dismiss his misbehavior from his mind. ...
But the individual who feels guilt must repent and atone for his sin."
And in the same passage she describes guilt as a ". . . response to a past
threat; for the Arapesh to the threat of loss of love if aggression has
been manifested, for the Manus to the threat of loss of support if the
emotions have not been controlled and socially directed."59 But if the
analysis of Piers and Singer holds valid, we must see shame as a response
to a past threat as well, though a threat of a different order than that
found in guilt: it is the threat of loss of love-which Dr. Mead has just
identified as the threat involved in guilt feelings. It appears that contradictory reports such as these will continue to be written until there is
more agreement about the actual nature of the phenomena, and until the
fundamentals-if full accord can ever be reached on them-are more
widely disseminated among field investigators who must deal with these
concepts.
By way of concluding, the fact should not be lost to sight that the
material presented here is meant to illustrate merely the ways in which
56. Id. at 488.
57. Id. at 494.

58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
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shame and ridicule may be used as social sanctions. While it is thought
that the conditions usually encountered in primitive societies are more
conducive to the development of shaming techniques, it is by no means
intended to suggest that all primitive communities place their main emphasis on the force of public opinion rather than on organized, coercive
measures. Three such groups, at least, are not able to rely heavily upon
easily-assailable egos: "In Bathonga, Samoa and Maori it is not sufficient for the group to jeer at or frighten its members; it has to use central authority against them."6 And as will be indicated shortly, shaming
techniques and ridicule may be employed quite extensively in densely
populated societies that are modern and technologically and industrially
advanced, such as Japan, and to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.
The Eskimos: Social Conformity Through "Song Duels." A curious
variation of the use of public ridicule as an instrument of social control
is afforded by the "song duels" of a number of Eskimo societies. Actually, song dueling is a quite substantial institution with them, and even
tends to take on some of the functions of a judicial organization, in contrast to the exclusively satirical role one might expect. That is to say, the
song duel not only serves to make known to all members of the community what modes of behavior should be abstained from if derisive
abuse is to be avoided, but operates as well to smooth over ill feelings
that have developed between estranged members of the group, and so
prevents such discord from evolving into open hostilities. Doing satisfaction between disputants so that an aggrieved party need not resort to
"self-help," that is, retaliatory measures taken at one's own initiative, is
a function claimed by any reputable legal system. A number of scholars
and authorities on legal institutions, however, have called attention to the
fact that the judicial remedies, of whatever sort, available in civilized
legal systems often tend to overlook certain psychological factors-perhaps in their "rationalistic" emphasis on material compensation for injuries and wrongs of every description, physical or otherwise-and thus
do not quite put the complaint to rest.
The Eskimo groups reported here seem to have achieved certain of
these intangible satisfactions in a measure greater than have we, even
though concepts of "substantive" law, i.e., meticulously delineated rights
and privileges between persons and detailed rules governing their relations with one another, play no part in these determinations. 6 "It is
sufficient that the litigants (contestants) feel relieved-the complaint
60. Id. at 495.
61. HOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 3 at 98-99.
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laid to rest-a psychological satisfaction attained and balance restored.
This is justice sufficient unto the needs of Eskimo society as the Eskimos
conceive it.""2
Though the song duels may have this auxiliary "civil law" function
of resolving disputes, there is no feature of song dueling that contradicts
the thesis that the effectiveness of ridicule and shame as social sanctions
is generally, but not always, a derivative of the intimate, face-to-face relations of social groups which are not populous and which thus do not
permit escape from public opinion in anonymity. Hoebel has pointedly
brought out the elements of their life that make Eskimos acutely responsive to community opinion. 3
The comprehensiveness, simplicity and conclusiveness of social control left entirely up to spontaneous reactions of society unquestionably
have a certain appeal, but their supposed merits are deceptive from several points of view. For one, social control without authoritarian sanctions just does not seem to work outside small, highly-personal social
groups. Moreover, not only is it entirely possible to entertain the value
judgment that social control effected primarily by rule of written law
is distinctly preferable to an unremitting deference to everyone else's
notions-of-the-moment about what is fitting and proper, but problems of
paramount importance can arise to the individual caught up in these situations of "excessive social control by society," if you will."4 The example
62. Id. at 99.
63. Hoebel, Law-Ways of the Primitive Eskimos, 31 J. Am. INsT. CRIm. L. & C.
665. Quotations from ANDERSON AND EELLS, ALASKA NATIVES: A SURVEY OF THEm
SOCIOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL STATUS

89b. and

BiRXET-SmiTH, THE Esxueos,

54-55:

"Riding in its mother's parka, peering at the world from under its mother's hood, the
Eskimo child is intimately associated with adult life from its earliest years on. No
nursery or formal school is necessary, for the infant's home is a one-room iglu 'where
the whole range of domestic economy and family experience passed before him and gave
him a part in the enterprise.' In western Alaska young boys spend many hours in the
kagigi (men's community club-house) where the adult males gather and work when not
out hunting....
"So direct and intimate experience in so limited a social world, in which sharing and
economic cooperation are the supreme virtues, makes all individuals (excepting the abnormals) extremely sensitive to social pressure. The fundamental problem of control is
solved at this point. It means that the need for an elaborated law system is forthwith
forestalled. It is sufficient, for the most part, that ridicule and disapproval in 'public
opinion' are effective goads to conformity. This accounts for Birket-Smith's judgment,
'if there is anything that can disturb the mind of the Eskimo, it is the prospect of standing alone against the crowd.'"
64. One well-regarded theory of social anthropology has it that when a culture
places undue stress on securing certain kinds of behavior of its members and denies them
completely the expression of activity which is contrary to these officially sanctioned
ways, that if the proscribed behavior is in fact the would-be manifestation of fundamental psychological drives, those drives will somehow find an outlet-whether that outlet be a sublimation of the basic motive force, a sub rosa expression of it, or merely an
admitted (but of course, regretted) contradiction of the theoretical cultural emphasis.
In other words, if a culture attempts to thoroughly crush a basic human drive, it will
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of the Eskimos under consideration here appears to be a case in point.
Here is wholesale control over the individual by his fellows, and here is
correspondingly undiluted pressure to find deliverance from this control.
If individual Nunivak Eskimos wished to avoid being gossiped aboutor lampooned before the group in satirical song-they had to submit to
the general requirements of conformity and agreeableness in everyday
behavior.6" Thus, on the face of it, this mechanism would seem to operate as a vicious circle, automatically resulting in a minimal amount of
gossiping and the maximum amount of social conformity: eccentric behavior would bring on gossiping, but the effect of being talked about by
others would be to enforce conformity on the deviationists; the increase
in conformity, however, would mean fewer opportunities for gossiping,
and so on ad infinitum. But in point of fact sharp gossiping is prevalent
among the Nunivak Eskimos. This is taken as an indication, not of
widespread, overt infractions of the general mandate for cooperativeness,
but rather that the gossiping itself is a release from the excessive pressures for conformability.6 6 In other words, Eskimo society simply would
not acknowledge that unwarranted gossip of others is in itself a violation of their professed philosophy of social harmony at all costs, or, alternatively, if they did have a vague awareness of the necessity for some
outlet for personal feelings that otherwise could not be expressed, then
we might put the practice down as a mere inconsistency that, so far as
the Eskimos were concerned, was to be winked at.
The song duels and joking partnerships, in like manner, may be
seen as an escape valve for aggressive tendencies: "Although physical
aggression was punished in one way or another, a rather devious verbal
aggression was actually encouraged."6 7 Another institution that provided a haven of respite from the continual interference of everybody
just simply fail.

Cultural notions of the good life which commonly fail are overly-

strict ideas about not expressing aggressiveness or hostility, overly-pure attitudes toward
premarital chastity and marital fidelity, and overly-exacting demands on each person to
suppress his individuality in favor of the common weal, i.e., utter submission to the expectations of others in matters of behavior.
The escape mechanisms from tight, inflexible systems of morality are an absorbing
study in themselves: sometimes relief comes in the form of a periodic holiday in which
most of the rules go by the board, as with one primitive group that permits virtually no
expression of individuality the whole year long except during one period of festivities
in which everyone indulges to his heart's content in a veritable orgy of individualism;
more often, as with the relatively private violations of the authorized code of propriety,
there is simply an incessant moral teeth-gnashing on the part of official keepers of the
public conscience, and profuse alarums about the general state of moral decay.
65. , LANTIs, THE SOCIAL CULTURE OF THE NUNIVAK ESlImO 262 (Transactions of
the American Philosophical Society, Vol. XXXV, pt. III).
66. Ibid.
67.. Ibid.
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into one's private life was the "serious partnership." Unlike the mockery
one had to put up with in the joking partnerships, a person could always
turn to his "serious partner" for help and a sense of security from the
usual stresses of interpersonal relationships: ". . . in the intimacy of
such a relationship, one could express oneself freely without fear that
every statement would be ridiculed as so often happened in other situations.""8
The joking partnerships and song duels themselves have evolved
particular forms and styles which must be followed if one is to achieve
the desired effect, or, in any event, which must be adhered to if one would
but avoid the disapprobation of his fellows for failing to live up to the
rules of the game. These rules are suggestive of the unwritten rules of
etiquette in most Western cultures that permit incisive verbal attacks upon one's enemies in polite society so long as there is a certain wit and
cleverness about it, and so long as a high degree of control is maintained
over the actual base, aggressive drives that motivate the attack.
• . . [T]he singer here endeavors to present his opponent in a
ludicrous light and hold him up to derision. Such songs always
originate in some old grudge or unsettled dispute, some incautious criticism, some words or action felt as an insult,
and perhaps breaking up an old friendship. The only means
then of restoring amicable relations is by vilifying each other
in song before the whole community assembled in the qag-e.
Here no mercy must be shown; it is indeed considered manly
to expose another's weakness with the utmost sharpness and
severity; but behind all such castigation there must be a touch
of humour, for mere abuse itself is barren, and cannot bring
about any reconciliation. It is legitimate to "be nasty," but
one must be amusing at the same time, so as to make the audience laugh; and the one who can thus silence his opponent
amid the laughter of the whole assembly, is the victor, and has
put an end to the unfriendly feeling. Manly rivals must, as
soon as they have given vent to their feelings, whether they
lose or win, regard their quarrel as a thing of the past, and
once more become good friends, exchanging valuable presents
to celebrate the reconciliation."
Reconciliation of the parties, of course, is not the expected outcome of a
68. Id. at 250.
69. R-AsMussEN,
1) 231-32.

REPORT or THE FIrH THULE EXPEDITION
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verbal clash according to the folkways of modern civilization, but among
the Eskimos, whether the song contest be of the conciliatory kind or
whether it be of the kind engaged in by friendly rivals who call themselves "song cousins" ("Song cousins may very well expose each other
in their respective songs, and thus deliver home truths, but it must always
be done in a humorous form, and in words so chosen as to excite no feeling among the audience but that of merriment.")," ° the recipient of the
metrical abuse had to show personal qualities that were highly esteemed
by members of the community: patience, forebearance, good humor."'
It is significant to note that these derisive songs could be used with impunity as vehicles for insults that under any other circumstances would
even lead to killings, such was the highly magnified sensitivity of members of most Eskimo communities to slighting references of this kind. 2
Rasmussen lists as the subjects which might be dealt with in the
song duels, "Acts of cruelty .

.

. or infidelity, or immoral conduct,

whereby is understood incest or sexual intercourse with animals. .... ""
and Pettit reports of other authorities having observed that, "A man
without children, and more certainly still, a woman without children, was
likely to be the butt of derision."4 Even delay in marriage raises uncomplimentary implications concerning personal qualifications. 1 In the
Point Barrow region the individual is humiliated by the mere knowledge
that he has been talked about in the men's house, even without specific
information on what was said."7 6 The same writer has recorded verbatim a number of songs actually sung in his presence, which in the
original forcefully illustrate the character and tone of the institution of
song dueling, in addition to disclosing in greater particularity some of
the topics dealt with (i.e., the specific kinds of unwanted behavior the
70. Id. at 231.
71. LANTIS, op. cit. supra note 65 at 250. Also, Id. at 244:

"...

no matter how

sharp the jokes might be, one had to take them like a good sport." It is hardly necessary
to add that with us as well the victim must show considerable restraint over the internal
rage such personal attacks actually engender, unless he is to suffer even greater loss
of caste.
72. PETTiT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 52, and RAsMUssEEN, op. cit. supra note 69,
Vol. II, No. 2 at 74: "Strangely enough, such revelations are always taken very coolly,
whereas angry or malicious words can otherwise produce the most far-reaching effects."
73. RAs ussEN, op. cit. supra note 69, Vol. II, No. 2, at 73.
74. PETTiT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 52.
75. Ibid., taken from RAsmussEN, PEOPLE OF THE POLAR NORTH (Herring trans.
and ed.).
76. Ibid., taken from NELsoN, THE ESKIMO ABOUT BERING STRAIT 293 (Reports of
the Bureau of American Ethnology No. 18).
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songs, in effect, were intended to cope with)."
77. RASMTUSSEN, op. cit. supra note 69, Vol. VII, No. 2 at 74-76 (the first song is
set out in full; the last two are excerpts of the original versions only)
Kanaihuaq derides Utahinia:
Ah, there you are, hayaiya Now what can it be
That strikes upon my opened ears?
Up on top of a hill
I heard
One of my cousins
Make up this song
Make up a song that ran thus:
It strikes upon my opened ears
Up on top of a hill:
Something I heard,
I should now like to tell
Everyone else . . .
That little habit of yours:
A hiding place for meat,
Utahfnia -

Far up by the end
Of the cooking place in the passage
way of the house,
So that your dear wife's
Food place by the lamp
Never was greasy with meat
At Itivneq
(i.e. he starves his wife but
feeds luxuriously himself).
And that was in the depth of the
great winter
Ayaiyai - ya
Yaiyaiya
Eyay6 - hayai - ya
Now I wonder how
This song will be received
In our feasting house?
Ufva yai - ya
III.

I am not much good at this sort
of thing.
Do I make too long a song of it?
It was his sister that he wanted,
So I heard
People say,
Well, he ought to be ashamed of
himself !
Do you think I would make up a
song of lies,
All lies, about one
Who never casts looks of longing
Towards his own little sister?
He ought to be ashamed of himself!

It is said that you, Utahania.
Came stealthily creeping
In to your little sister
Qahatlovaq
To go a-whoring with her!
And then, when she asked you
"What is it you want?"
You looked rather foolish, did
you not?
And so to deride you,
I sing this song

IV.

I heard it said
That Utahnia
Went out hunting
In the winter
It was at that season when the
caribou are scarce.
At any rate, the sort whose skins
are used for breeches.
And your stepson and your dear
wife

Had to go creeping
When you left them behind
(i.e. deserted them, leaving
them to starve to death)
But they came up with your sledge
tracks all the same.
For you never had any food to
give them,
Every mouthful
Was snapped up by you first . . .
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In summary of this discussion of the Eskimos' elaborate use of ridicule in song-a procedure on which other cultures place little if any emphasis-it is appropriate to consider Pettit's general interpretation of the
matter, in which he suggests what may be the ultimate raison d'etre of
the song duels and the peculiar forms into which they have developed:
"The effectiveness of this song dueling lay not simply in reciting calumnies, but rather in the accuracy with which the foibles of an opponent
were depicted, and in the cleverness of the verse. The real object was
not so much to insult an individual by what was said as to gain the support of the audience and to drown the victim in a flood of derisive laughter. . .. According to Birket-Smith the object of these contests is to
make the other fellow realize that public opinion is against him. It is a
form of punishment, though not consciously recognized as such.""
Two CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS

The generalization has been enunciated several times already that
conditions of primitive society are the most favorably disposed for the
development of institutions and techniques of shaming as modes of social control, and that "legalistic" sanctions become necessary when these
conditions no longer obtain-as in highly populated civilizations. The
point once made, however, should not be overemphasized. As has become evident, not all primitive groups are able to rely on the force of
public opinion to control human behavior, and even those which are able
must resort to other measures, in part at any rate. And, conversely, at
least a few populous, civilized societies find it expedient to use shaming
techniques to a surprising extent. This part of the study will explore
shaming procedures utilized in two modern civilizations, Japan and the
Soviet Union, and examine the rationale purporting to lie behind those
procedures-whether such theoretical or practical substantiation is openly
volunteered by the society in question, or instead must be pieced together
from information implicit in available materials of whatever origin. A
greater appreciation of the limits a sense of shame as a social control
mechanism has in surroundings not generally suited for its enhancement,
Kanaihuaq, it turns out, is not beyond reproach himself and Utahania puts every
effort into making the most of the fact. His first song relates in embarrassing detail
how Kanaihuaq was soundly defeated, both physically and morally, in a family tiff with
his wife that he himself had brought about, and for no good reason. Having the whole
sequence of events repeated before the group was more humiliating than the incident
itself. (Id. at 77-78.) In the second song Kanaihuaq receives abuse on the ground that
he "has been making up to the white man in a snobbish fashion, has learned to write the
sign alphabet of the missionaries, and now finally imagines himself a great man, a chief,
one who thinks for others and can order his neighbors about." (Id. at 78.)
78. PETTiT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 52, taken in part from BIRKET-SMrTH, Op. cit.
szupra note 63 at 55.
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as well as the particulars of those factors seeming necessary to offset the
inhospitable environment, it is hoped, will be the outcome.
Japan: A Case Study in Shame as an Institution. Japan is the foremost example of densely peopled societies in which shame sanctions feature predominately enough to entitle them to the designation "institution." The phenomenon there, in fact, reaches to inordinate lengths, at
least in comparison with other civilizations that do not instill such a degree of sensitivity to the opinions of others into their populace.
The immediate reason for this seems unquestionably to be that it is
simply part of the Japanese culture pattern to condition children to be
responsive to what others think about one's behavior, much in the way
primitives do. For the primitives, however, it is the eminently manifest
course to pursue: they see it, if only unconsciously, as the simplest and
most direct way of achieving and maintaining conformity-and they
recognize that the circumstances of their life will make it work. As for
the ultimate reason Japan has chosen this cultural pattern and stayed
with it-and elaborated it exquisitely-when other civilized societies have
had to make much greater use of authoritarian sanctions, perhaps it is because, despite the complexity of their culture and their great population,
one vital feature of the small primitive group still remains there to a
greater extent than might be anticipated: "Because there is little privacy
in a Japanese community . . . it is no fantasy that 'the world' knows
practically everything he does and can reject him if it disapproves. Even
the construction of the Japanese house-the thin walls that permit the
passage of sounds and which are pushed open during the day-makes
private life extremely public for those who cannot afford a wall and
''
garden.17
It will be useful, then, for a critical assessment of shame as a regulator of human behavior, to proceed by examining in greater detail the
ways of the Japanese in "sensitizing" individuals to the expectations of
others, and how these expectations and responses function to make up a
considerable segment of, and integrate with, the overall pattern of social
control in that country. Similarly, as has been suggested earlier, an
acute sensitivity to shame sanctions, while it may typify primitive societies, does not derive entirely from the conditions of life as such usually
encountered in them. Rather it comes from an intense process of conditioning commenced in early life. Perhaps it is imperfectly, or even instinctively, understood by those upon whom the responsibility devolves,
that such methods of enforcing cultural ideals are feasible to a much
79.
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greater degree after a period of "training," but the very least that can be
said is that the development of a responsiveness to shame sanctions is not
by any means left to mere chance, that is, left to whatever pressures of
public opinion might normally be operative in the intimate relations of a
small social group. We might expect, therefore, that a culture such as
that of the Japanese would engage in child-rearing practices calculated
to produce shame-sensitive adults as assiduously as do primitive peoples,
if not more so in view of the fact that most complex civilizations like
theirs find it necessary to resort to guilt sanctions and authoritarian legal or religious institutions to do most of the heavy work of enforcing
conformity to the collectively held cultural ideals. And such is the case.
The process begins when the child is still an infant of two or three
years, and can barely grasp the significance of what is going on about
him-a process of molding, of character formation that will profoundly
affect his entire life.

He is even shamed into weaning:

".

.

. all

mothers tease [their children] by telling them that they are mere babies
if they want to nurse. 'Look at your little cousin. He's a man. He's
little like you and he doesn't ask to nurse.' 'That little boy is laughing at
you because you're a boy and you still want to nurse.' Two-, three-, and
four-year-old children who are still demanding their mother's breast will
often drop it and feign indifference when an older child is heard approaching."8 And in the following extract from the same source we see
convincing support for the view of psychological researchers that shame
anxiety finds its roots in the early separation anxiety and the threat of
loss of parental love:
This teasing, this urging a child toward adulthood, is not
confined to weaning. From the time the child can understand
what is said to it, these techniques are common in any situation.
A mother will say to her boy baby when he cries, 'You're not a
girl,' or 'You're a man.' Or she will say, 'Look at that baby. He
doesn't cry.' When another baby is brought to visit, she will
fondle the visitor in her own child's presence and say, 'I'm going to adopt this baby. I want such a nice, good child. You
don't act your age.' Her own child throws itself upon her,
often pommeling her with its fists, and cries, 'No, no, we don't
want any other baby. I'll do what you say.' When the child of
one or two has been noisy or has failed to be prompt about
something, the mother will say to a man visitor, 'Will you take
this child away? We don't want it.' The visitor acts out his
80. Id. at 261-62.
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r6le. He starts to take the child out of the house. The baby
screams and calls upon its mother to rescue it. He has a fullsized tantrum. When she thinks the teasing has worked, she
relents and takes back the child, exacting its frenzied promise
to be good. The little play is acted out sometimes with children
who are as old as five or six.
Teasing takes another form too. The mother will turn to
her husband and say to the child, 'I like your father better than
you. He is such a nice man.' The child gives full expression
to his jealousy and tries to break in between his father and
mother. His mother says, 'Your father doesn't shout around
the house and run around the rooms.' 'No, no,' the child protests, 'I won't either. I am good. Now do you love me?'
When the baby has gone on long enough, the father and mother
look at one another and smile. They may tease a young
daughter in this way as well as a young son.
Such experiences are rich soil for the fear of ridicule and
ostracism which is so marked in the Japanese grown-up. It is
impossible to say how soon little children understand that they
are being made game of by this teasing, but understand it they
do sooner or later, and when they do, the sense of being laughed
at fuses with the panic of the child threatened with loss of all
that is safe and familiar. When he is a groz inan, being
laughed at retains this childhood aura.8 [Emphasis added.]
The drilling in what amounts to an almost pathological concern in
the Japanese for how others will regard one's behavior continues with
full vigor after the second or third year of school:
More emphasis at home and in school

.

.

. is laid on the

dangers of getting into 'embarrassing' situations. Children are
still too young for 'shame,' but they must be taught to avoid
being 'embarrassed.' . . . Many Japanese say that it was their

schoolmates who laughed at them first when they made mistakes-not their teachers or their parents. The job of their
elders, indeed, is not, at this point, themselves to use ridicule
on the children, but gradually to integrate the fact of ridicule
with the moral lesson of living up to gir [i.e., duties or obligations]-to-the-world.

[These] obligations . . . now gradually

become a whole series of restraints. 'If you do this, if you do
that,' their elders say, 'the world will laugh at you.' The rules
81. Id. at 262-63.
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are particularistic and situational and a great many of them
concern what we should call etiquette. They require subordinating one's own will to the ever-increasing duties to neighbors, to family and to country."2
The earnestness with which this conditioning is undertaken by both
the child's family and associates is unique in sociological experience.
Most cultures that attempt to infuse this heightened sensitivity, this vulnerability of the ego, into the young, venture to hold merely the threat of
rejection and loss of love out to them, in the hope that conformity will
result. Only in the most incorrigible cases, perhaps, would actual abandonment occur, and certainly such is not the original intention. So extraordinary are the Japanese in this respect, however, that Gorer was
prompted to comment thus:
It is worth emphasizing that the degree to which this is
carried is very uncommon sociologically. In most societies
where the extended family or other fractional social group is
operative, the group will usually rally to protect one of its
members who is under criticism or attack from members of
other groups. Provided that the approval of one's own group
is maintained, one can face the rest of the world with the assurance of full support in case of need or attack. In Japan
however it appears that the reverse is the case; one is only sure
of support from one's own group as long as approval is given
by other groups; if outsiders disapprove or criticize, one's own
group will turn against one and act as punishing agents, until or
unless the individual can force the other group to withdraw its
criticism. By this mechanism the approval of the "outside
world" takes on an importance probably unparalleled in any
83

other society.

Dr. Benedict's own research and experience with the Japanese provide
ample support for this view, as related in the following paragraph:
This change of status is communicated to the growing boy
by a new and serious extension of the pattern of babyhood
teasing. By the time he is eight or nine his family may in
sober truth reject him. If his teacher reports that he has been
disobedient or disrespectful and gives him a black mark in
82. Id. at 272-73.
83. Id. at 274, quoted from GoRER,
stitute for International Studies 1943).
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deportment, his family turn against him. If he is criticized for
some mischief by the storekeeper, 'the family name has been
disgraced.' His family are a solid phalanx of accusation. Two
Japanese I have known were told by their fathers before they
were ten not to come home again and were too ashamed to go
to relatives. They had been punished by their teachers in the
schoolroom. In both cases they lived in outhouses, where their
mothers found them and finally arranged for their return....
In any case the family shows that now it looks upon the boy
as their representative in the world and they proceed against
him because he has incurred criticism. He has not lived up to
his giri-to-the-world. He cannot look to his family for support. Nor can he look to his age group. His schoolmates ostracize him for offenses and he has to apologize and make
promises before he is readmitted.84
Shortly after the lesson of "giri-to-the-world" has been assimilated,
the Japanese child is taught "gir-to-his-name." Learning this duty (or
obligation) to one's name amounts to making the ego even more vulnerable to assaults from without than it already is. The child learns that
the concept of "honor" is intimately entwined with his name and that
insults are to be greatly resented. Coincident with this he learns that
such insults are in addition to be avenged, and from then on he is never
quite at peace with the world so long as he is carrying the burden of an
unvindicated trespass to his dignity. As a result, the hazing which most
Japanese boys must endure in the middle school or in the army cannot be
taken with equanimity or in the spirit of fun as it usually can in other
countries where it is practiced. The seriousness with which these resentments are harbored is a yardstick of the ego-sensitivity of the typical
Japanese to slighting references, and thus to criticism or shaming techniques in general.
A younger boy who has been made to grovel before an upperclassman and run servile errands hates his tormentor and plans
revenge. The fact that the revenge has to be postponed makes
it all the more absorbing. It is gir-to-his-name and he regards
it as a virtue. Sometimes he is able, through family pull, to
get the tormentor discharged from a job years later. Sometimes he perfects himself in jujitsu or sword play and publicly
humiliates him on a city street after they have both left school.
But unless he sometime evens the score he has that 'feeling of
84. Id. at 273-74.
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something left undone' which is the core of the Japanese insult contest.8 5
Dr. Benedict has even suggested that the brutality of the Japanese
Army during the world war was due in large measure to the humiliating
stunts recruits were put through. This seems a trifle far-fetched at first,
but not after one is acquainted with the reasoning in support of the
hypothesis. "The draftees have often been described as coming out of
their Army training with changed personalities, as 'true jingo nationalists' . . . . Young men trained in family life in the Japanese manner

and deadly serious about their amour-propre may easily become brutalized in such a situation [as hazing]. They cannot stand ridicule. What
they interpret as rejection may make them good torturers in their
turn. . . . The tormented 'feel good' when they are able to settle scores
with the tormentors." 8 Rather than having "changed" her fundamental
outlook since the Russo-Japanese war, as it has been said of Japan, the
difference is better accounted for, Dr. Benedict feels, by the fact that
"she did not consider that that nation [Russia] had sneered at her"87
'
and therefore, even as a victor, could treat her vanquished enemy with
the greatest deference and respect and go to great lengths to avoid humiliating her. With America during World War II, such was not at all
the case, at least from the Japanese point of view.
. . . [E] very Japanese was reared in the nineteen-twenties and
-thirties to regard United States policy as 'taking Japan cheap,'
or in their phrase, 'making her as faeces.' This had been Japan's
reaction to the Exclusion Act, to the part the United States
played in the Treaty of Portsmouth and in the Naval Parity
agreements. The Japanese had been encouraged to regard in
the same way the growing economic r6le of the United States
in the Far East and our racial attitudes toward the non-white
peoples of the world. The victory over Russia and the victory
over the United States in the Philippines, therefore, illustrate
Japanese behavior in its two most opposed aspects: when insults are involved and when they are not.88
It should not be surprising that a people so accustomed to detecting
indications of insult or disapprobation from those of their own community would also be alert to ridicule and detraction coming from foreign
85. Id. at 277.
86. Id. at 277-78
87. Id. at 307.

88. Id. at 308-09.
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quarters. Personal identification or emotional involvement with institutions-or even symbols of institutions-is of course not unique in human
experience, but in Japan the importance of defending one's self-respect,
even when only indirectly or by association as in this instance, from
outside attacks has almost no equal.
[The Japanese] continually spoke of how 'the eyes of the world
were upon them.' Therefore they must show to the full spirit
of Japan. Americans landed on Guadalcanal, and Japanese
orders to troops were that now they were under direct observation 'by the world' and should show what they were made of.
Japanese seamen were warned that in case they were torpedoed
and the order given to abandon ship, they should man the lifeboats with the utmost decorum or 'the world will laugh at you.
The Americans will take movies of you and show them in
New York.' It mattered what account they gave of themselves to the world. And their concern with this point also was
a concern deeply imbedded in Japanese culture."9
Not only was there national concern about maintaining dignity in
carrying out the war, but ever since the latter part of the nineteenth
century when the industrialization and westernization of Japan was
undertaken and when foreigners began to emerge prominently on the
Japanese scene, have they shown concern about what other nations
thought of them, or even of their traditional habits and attitudes. A
number of Japanese institutions have actually been modified or done
away with in deference to foreign-mostly Western-notions of morality. One was that of mixed bathing, nude, about which prior to this the
Japanese felt no shame whatever.9" All efforts to change their attitudes
about this came at the instigation of the Japanese government for, as
might be anticipated, it would be the agency to take upon itself the task
of sounding out foreign opinion and seeing that the entire Japanese
nation kowtow to it. In the usual circumstances there would be little
contact between most foreigners and the vast majority of the Japanese
people, and the latter probably would not be in a position to sense any
disapproval of the foreigners. But government functionaries are more
readily exposed to the critical writings of foreign visitors, and it is they
who, when personally encountering foreigners in an official capacity,
would have to endure the imagined (or even real) disdain engendered in
the visitors by these traditional practices.
89. Id. at 28-29.

90. Id. at 268.
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Among the other institutions to feel the effects of this desire to win
outside approval was that of prostitution, though here only token submission to alien notions of propriety was achieved: the girls used to sit
outside the houses, that prospective customers could leisurely and carefully assess their charms; now only photographs of the young ladies are
on display on the exteriors of the establishments, and the clientele must
content themselves with such makeshift aids in arriving at their decision. 9 The same went for homosexual practices which, "In Old Japan
. . . were the sanctioned pleasures of men of high status such as the

samurai and the priests.""2 They were outlawed, but, as outlawing them
was merely an expression of their desire to curry the favor of Westerners,
no impact whatsoever was made on their real attitude toward it. In fact,
they felt no moral attitude about it at all, nor did they about the widespread practice of autoeroticism. To them, both fall in the category of
"human feelings," about which moralistic attitudes are quite inappropriate so long as they are reasonably kept in their place and not permitted to
interfere with the really weighty concerns of life, such as raising a family.
Efforts were made, however, to curb some of the more obvious publicity
the autoerotic instruments were receiving. ("No people have ever had
such paraphernalia for the purpose.") 9" But again, official suppression
of that which the Japanese had thoroughly accepted did not convince
them of its inherent immorality.
Dr. Benedict has given close attention to the cultural interpretation
and rationale the Japanese themselves place upon the character structure
and psychological mechanisms typically produced by this process of sensitization of the individual to the judgments and critical evaluations of
those about him. A brief review of her findings and analysis is wellsuited for concluding the foregoing exposition of the features of shame
which come into play once the individual is thoroughly imbued with a
responsiveness to it. Nice semantic distinctions enter in here, and evidence how, for example, a cultural world view may impinge upon the
substantive content of words in ways that are the bane of translators.
The Japanese word for "self-respect" (jicho), as an instance, is synonymous with the word for "circumspection." Whereas we, with more of
a solid core of inner guilt sanctions, tend to identify self-respect with a
clear conscience, that is, with not having "sinned" before God or before
one's self-whether other people know of it or not-the Japanese say
91. Id. at 186-87.
92. Id. at 187.

93. Id. at 188.
94. Ibid.
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that self-respect includes "watchfulness of all the cues one observes in
other people's acts, and a strong sense that other people are sitting in
judgment. 'One cultivates self-respect (one must jicho),' they say, 'because of society.' 'If there were no society one would not need to respect
oneself (cultivate jicho)."" Dr. Benedict adds, however, that these extreme statements of external sanctions for self-respect overstate the case
for them, as do the popular sayings of many nations, "for Japanese sometimes react as strongly as any Puritan to a private accumulation of guilt.
But their extreme statements nevertheless point out correctly where the
emphasis falls in Japan. It falls on the importance of shame rather than
on the importance of guilt."9"
As previously stated, shame cultures may provide for persons who
have been chagrined the wherewithal or means to overcome their disconcerting feelings, but confession is not one of them. It not only brings
no relief as it does with guilt, but the very thought of making one's
pecadillos known to others is abhorrent to a people whose every act and
word is carefully calculated to conceal from those others one's weaknesses
and shortcomings. "So long as [a man's] bad behavior does not 'get
out into the world,' he need not be troubled and confession appears to
him merely a way of courting trouble. Shame cultures therefore do not
provide for confessions, even to the gods. They have ceremonies for
good luck rather than for expiation.""7
The Japanese regard for the virtue of circumspection, or the ability
to accurately perceive how others will respond to contemplated behavior,
or even words, has been personified in what they refer to as the "observing self." This "observing self" acts somewhat as a mentor of shame
(haji), and is inculcated in early childhood to accompany the individual
throughout his life and guide him along the paths of proper behavior, i.e.,
behavior that will not evoke the ridicule or condemnation of his fellows.
(This makes the concepts of the "observing self" and "internalized
shame" sound quite alike, though Dr. Benedict does not suggest this
analogy.) The "observing self" obviously represents the lifelong process
of conditioning one's self to the reactions or expected reactions of others
towards one's behavior. Stated another way, a Japanese learns at a very
early age that the disapprobation of his family and associates is the worst
thing that can happen to him, but he does not quite know which particular
acts and words of his will merit their scorn and which their approval.
But he starts learning soon enough by trial and error, and before long
95. Id. at 222.
96. Ibid.
97. Id. at 223.
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has built up a considerable repository of past experiences which, at least
by indirection, will guide him in his future conduct. The truly "virtuous" citizen (as they call one who "knows shame," i.e., knows how to
orient his behavior to avoid being shamed), then, is the one who has
most accurately attuned his senses of perception to the subtle nuances of
response-whether of approbation or detraction-of those about him.
He approaches a sort of moral perfection, as we would call it, much as a
seeker after the Holy Grail achieves moral perfection by disciplining himself to adroitly sidestep "sin," even little sins.
Nevertheless, the burden of the "observing self," however much it
may assist in avoiding "shame," becomes a not insubstantial millstone
around the neck of the Japanese-as could be expected, observing the
psychological toll taken and tensions that develop in persons in guilt cultures who feel constrained to lead all-too-saintly a life, and make the attempt by bottling up or denying completely some of the more basic drives
and not allowing them even an indirect or substitute outlet. As testimony
to the oppressive character of the "observing self," recurring symbols in
Japanese folkways depict a state of human existence in which the "observing self" has been eliminated. Dr. Benedict also attributes to this
their notions of "expert" self-discipline. Such "expertness" is thought
of as making possible the elimination of the "observing self," and thus
one may return to the directness of early childhood when shame was unknown, that is, when the "observing self" was not there to look over one's
shoulder at one's every move.9" She presents evidence to suggest that
even the appeal of Zen Buddhism to the Japanese lies mainly in the techniques it teaches for achieving the psychological frame of mind known
as muga. Mu1ga, at least for the Japanese, means a condition of "freedom and efficiency," with the "observer self" eliminated. Hence it is a
much sought-after and highly cherished state of affairs indeed-a
means for a person "To deliver [one's] self up to the ecstacy of [one's]
soul. .... ,"

The most extreme form in which the Japanese state this
tenet, at least to the ears of an Occidental, is the way they supremely approve of the man 'who lives as already dead.' . . .
[which means to the Japanese] that one lives on the plane of
'expertness.' . . .The philosophy which underlies muga underlies also 'living as already dead.' In this state a man eliminates
all self-watchfulness and thus all fear and circumspection. He
98. Id. at 289.
99. Id. at 248.
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becomes as the dead, who have passed beyond the necessity of
taking thought about the proper course of action. .

.

. [It]

means a supreme release from conflict. It means, 'My energy
and attention are free to pass directly to the fulfillment of my
purpose. My observer-self with all its burden of fears is no
longer between me and my goal. With it have gone the sense
of tenseness and strain and the tendency toward depression that
troubled
my earlier strivings. Now all things are possible to
,10 o
me.

It is suggested, in view of the evidence implicit in Dr. Benedict's
own words, that describing the elimination of the "observing self" as
equivalent to a return to childhood when shame was unknown, is not the
best interpretation. It is true that the "observing self" does not exist in
childhood, i.e., training in circumspection has not yet begun at that time,
but it hardly follows that the circumstances of childhood are what is being sought in their efforts to eliminate the "observing self." The uninhibited behavior and self-indulgence of early childhood 1 .. would certainly not be appropriate in the adult pattern of life in Japan, and would
seldom serve to make a Japanese feel "free and efficient" in his everyday
dealings with his fellows. Similarly, the unrestrained activity of childhood would not likely help "the painter, the poet, the public speaker and
the warrior" achieve the greatness and perfection they seek in training
themselves in muga.
Rather than the uninhibited "shamelessness" of children, it would
seem that what is referred to is the elimination of the "observing self"
by becoming so adept in anticipating the reactions of others to one's
words and acts that the highest approval-and never condemnation-is
received from them. It is submitted that the "elimination" is actually
nothing more than the patterns of correct behavior becoming so deeply
ingrained that they are an automatic, habitual response, and one simply
need no longer refer to his "eidetic other" as a guide to contemplated behavior. We would call this "gaining confidence in interpersonal relations," or becoming so sure of ourselves in dealing with others that
blunders will not be made and thus we will not be made to appear ridiculous, that the anxiety normally accompanying these relations vanishes.
The difference is that these matters are of far greater consequence for
100. Id. at 249-50.
101. Extensive information on this is presented in another section of Dr. Benedict's
book. The prevalent permissive attitude in Japan toward uninhibited childhood behavior
does not conflict, according to her description, with the fact that training in sensitivity
to shame commences at a very early age, but space limitations prevent going into this
in detail here.
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them than for us. And too, this explanation would better account for
their references to arriving at a plane of "expertness"-which otherwise
is difficult to fit into a concept that the elimination of the "observing
self" is in essence a return to the naturalness of childhood.
The "'Windows of Satire" of Soviet Russia. During visits to the
Soviet Union in the summers of 1958 and 1959, the writer encountered
a peculiar application of public ridicule and shaming in that country.
Though the precise means by which it was effected probably has neither
historical nor contemporary counterpart, it appeared to be in no way at
variance with other instances of public shaming that might be cited, at
least with respect to the point that the end purpose of such activities is
ultimately to achieve a certain measure of social control-whether the
individuals concerned consciously recognize it or not.
So-called "Windows of Satire" (Okna Satiri) were observed in
four geographically distant places and each under distinctly different
circumstances, giving the impression of being a somewhat uniform,
ubiquitous and even institutionalized phenomenon in the Russian society
of today. Before proceeding with a more detailed characterization of
these "windows," however, attention should be called to the fact that
they were not of the same order as the bulletin boards and signs which
lampoon certain general aspects of Soviet life. These latter may, for instance, deride citizens who watch television to excess, or parents who indignantly take schoolteachers to task about grades awarded by them to
their offspring, but they do so without identifying any of the particular
individuals who may have yielded to such vices. This generalized kind
of satire is prevalent as well in the U.S.S.R., but will be seen under the
identifying caption, Krokodil (Crocodile)-apparently an allusion to the
archaic notion that a crocodile sheds tears over those whom it devours.
Krokodil is also the name of the Soviet "humor" magazine, a publication
devoted largely to parodying-constructively, of course-institutions and
ways deemed worthy of ridicule or even reform.
The windows of satire, on the other hand, all dealt with specific acts
of specific individuals whose behavior was considered contra bonos mores.
On a collective farm, where most people would know the transgressors
personally, their names apparently were thought adequate for singling
them out, but in a city like Moscow not only would the full name and
address be included in the displays in the windows, but also the year of
birth, occupation and place of employment, and date the incident occurred. A recitation of the offense followed, along with a large caricature in color of the subject performing the antisocial deed-usually of a
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minor nature and probably punishable only under a public-nuisance type
of ordinance if at all, were such sanction to be invoked in place of, or in
addition to, making the person an object of public derision. Those in
charge of the "Window of Satire and Humor" seen on a collective farm
in the Ukraine near the city of Kiev even went to the trouble of composing poems (which actually rhymed in the original Ukranian) to commemorate the events and mock the malfeasors.
In every instance the windows of satire were not in any manner of
speaking merely informal bulletin boards on which a person at his own
initiative might post items he considered suitable. They were all of wellconstructed wooden frames with glass-paned doors and locks. Each door
covered one "section," and each section was completely filled out by a
white cardboard poster about two by three feet in size on which the
caricature was drawn and details of the alleged offense were set forth.
Undoubtedly these were replaced with new posters from time to time.
One seen in a Moscow railroad station had an elaborate inscription
painted on the wooden frame above to the effect that this was "Window
of Satire No. 2" and that it was sponsored by "An Organ of the Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League, Moscow Junction of the Northern Railroad."
The third occasion on which a window of satire was noticed was
along the main street, between the sidewalk and curb, of a city near
Stalingrad which was built originally for the sole purpose of accommodating workers and their families employed in erecting the giant hydroelectric dam under construction there. It was seen from a passing bus
just long enough to be identified, thus details of the satirical posters on
view in it could not be recorded. The fourth was observed under similar
circumstances: from a bus passing through a village of an estimated
thirty or forty people located on the main highway about halfway between Moscow and Leningrad. 2 Only texts of the first two windows
mentioned above, therefore, are available for examination.'
102. A photograph was taken from the moving vehicle, however, and shows the
village window of satire painted in bright colors. A black-and-white close-up photograph of the window on the collective farm is also in the writer's possession, and shows
the caricatures and inscriptions in full detail.
103. [Yaroslavsky Railway Station located on Komsomolskaya Square, Moscow]:
WINDOW OF SATIRE No. 2
An Organ of the Committee of the All-Union Lenin
Young Communist League, Moscow Junction of the Northern Railroad
Donyetsko, Vasili Ivanovich
1930 year of birth
Resides in the city of Babushkin
Medvedkovskoye Road
House 20
Apartment 35
Ran at full speed to catch a train April 5, 1958.
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It is not surprising that the use of public ridicule to make examples
of those who have defied the accepted norms and conventions of the community has taken a form such as the windows of satire in the Soviet
Union. Considering Russia's large and growing population, and more
importantly, the fact that increasing industrialization fosters increasing
Zaitsiev, Aleksandr Vasilyevich
Resides in the District of Ashukinskaya
Moskovskaya Street, House 23
Northern Railroad
Renikovskaya Factory
Employed as a painter
Kalinin, Nikolai Vasilyevich
Apartment 74
Galyanovskaya Street, House 7
Resides in Moscow
Employed in the 1st Stamping Dept. as a fitter-assembler.
Were found in an intoxicated condition in the railroad station, disturbed the peace,
accosted citizens, expressed obscenities.
Kuznyetsov, Anatoli Valentinovich
Resides in the city of Moscow
1927 year of birth
Apartment 4
House 16
District of Krasnosyelskaya
Employed as an engineer at the All-Union Central Scientific Research Institute of the
International Industrial Secretariat.
At the passageway to the platform, refused to present a ticket and called the platform ticket inspector obscene names.
[Collective Farm named after Stalin, near Kiev, capitol of the Ukranian Soviet Socialist
Republic] :
WINDOW OF SATIRE AND HUMOR*
Komsomolka [member of Communist Youth Organization)
Gorai, Maria Ivanivna
Doesn't want to work anywhere.
From time to time she goes to Kiev
and makes 75 to 100 karbovantsi [Ukranian rubles] a month.
She comes home and starts
breaking oven-forks over the shoulders of her old
father, who actually works every day
on the Collective Farm.
Maria has but one desire:
"How to get money ?"
But everyone knows that to get it
One must labor.

But work she doesn't want,
Instead chases her father out to do it,
And every day breaks
Stove-forks over the old man.

Ivanitski, Dmitro Kindratovich
Takes advantage of all the privileges of a collective farm worker,
but does not work on the Collective Farm.
On the Collective Farm he does not work,
He has no "work-day units" to his credit,
Instead he runs all over the village
In search of the fast buck.
At times he sets out fishing nets,
At other times works a bit on doors,
And yet other times, drunk half to death,
He spends the night in a gutter!
* Thanks are acknowledged to Mr. Andrew Turchyn of the Indiana University Libraries

for assistance in translating the Ukranian.
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urbanization and all that urban life inescapably implies-the depersonalizing of human relationships-such bulletin boards would be one of the
few ways available for singling out the errant individual and exposing
him to the repercussions of community feeling. And even the collective
farms are more aptly described as "agricultural communities" than
"farms" (the latter term suggesting the kind we are accustomed to), each
having generally from two to twenty thousand people.
What is more difficult to account for is why, under what would
seem the relatively anonymous and anything-but-intimate relations of life
obtaining in present Soviet society, any extensive attempt at all has been
made to enforce conformity to social ideals by means of the pressures of
public opinion. The element of astonishment in encountering such a
phenomenon there is that most culture groups in an environmental setting
like that of the Soviet Union would have given up any concerted, programmed efforts at trying to make do under those circumstances what
most frequently is productive of tangible results in small social groups
with their customary face-to-face relations. Most cultures would long
ago have turned to legal sanctions and the nurturing of an individualized
sense of guilt. The Soviets, of course, have resorted to these as well,
but they apparently feel that the force of public opinion is still potent
enough-despite the theoretical opportunities for "escaping in anonymity"-that it may be relied upon to do at least some of the work of
social control.
It is not implausible to suppose that the answer to this may be found
primarily in the philosophical emphases of the culture. First of all, there
is the comparative lack of ideals of rugged individualism in Russia, ideals
which permeate the ideological atmosphere Americans breathe from childhood on to such an extent that most of us come to believe they are some
sort of cultural imperative. In our eyes any group that does not at the
very least give impassioned lip service to these ideals on every conceivable
public occasion is a pretty namby-pamby bunch indeed. We picture the
utter impossibility of some government bureaucrat erecting a window of
satire on Main Street in the courthouse square with the idea of mocking
the taxpayers who are his masters, and from this presume that it would
be as abhorrent to a people brought up differently. Whatever may have
been the Weltanshauung of pre-Revolutionary Russia, Communist teachings since then have, on paper at least, certainly promoted to the utmost a
feeling of collective responsibility on the part of every member of the
society toward all other members, and in theory no affair of thought or
conduct is too minute or too subjective to escape the ambit of this official doctrine. If conditioning in this has been successful, as it by and
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large seems to have been-not necessarily in the actual, everyday behavior patterns of the average Soviet citizen, but in his announced personal philosophy 04 -then there is reason enough to believe that he would
show concern about having it pointed out to him how he had encroached
upon the postulated interests and the well-being of the group. He would
not be able to dismiss-an accusation of this sort as would one thoroughly
steeped in a tradition of individualism and absolute standards of morality-who would not be disconcerted in the slightest by what others
thought of his obnoxious or eccentric behavior so long as he had not
trodden upon his internalized moral code.
But we cannot disregard, in this connection, the fact that Mead and
others have reported the emergence of a "Protestant personality type" in
the Soviet Union, at least as a cultural ideal.1"' And the Soviets have
even gone so far as to have consolidated these ideals and personified them
in what they call the "New Soviet Man," and the citizenry is constantly
exhorted to become more like this abstraction, much as professing Christians are berated perhaps once a week to be more like what the "good
Christian" is conceived to be. Obviously, the introduction of these circumstances into the picture complicates things. Not only would the
Soviet Union apparently be attaching importance to guilt sanctions as
well as legal sanctions, but even the windows of satire might be seen
more as a guilt rather than a shame mechanism: at first blush it would
seem that their effectiveness derives from shaming the individual before
others for his conduct, but when we remember that a caricature placed
in one of a number of railroad stations in a city of over seven million
people is not going to shame him before many of the people actually in
his personal acquaintance, then there seems to be reason enough to question our premises. Indeed, perhaps not one of the persons even remotely
associated with the errant individual will ever learn of his misdeed,
though advertising his address and place of employment is certainly
calculated to preclude this from happening. Accordingly, the windows
of satire could be regarded as an agency for pointing out to the social
transgressor-and more importantly, to every member of the community-what deviations from the official moral code are, i.e., what the
New Soviet Man would not do. That being the case, the situation
104.

Instances of this are legion, as I am sure most travelers there can substantiate.

In the city of Czernowitz, formerly belonging to Rumania but now completely Sovieticized, I got into the usual conversation with several dozen Russians in a park, and during the course of it was asked what my occupation was. Upon replying that I was studying to be a lawyer, the following question was immediately put to me: "When you get to
be a lawyer, are you going to work for the people or for the special interests ?"
105. PIERS AND SINGER, op. cit. supra note 5 at 46.
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would seem even more like guilt and its associated phenomena, especially
if many of the "victims" may in fact resort to considerable escape in
anonymity.
A way out of this conceptual dilemma may possibly be found by
recourse to the criterion proposed by Piers and Singer. We must look
to the nature of the threat posed to the individual. I would suggest that
the threat of being derided in a window of satire is that of rejection and
abandonment by those whose love and approval are important for the individual to retain. This of course returns the window of satire back to
the shame-mechanism category, and perhaps this also goes for the idealization of the New Soviet Man, if the same threat- can be linked to it.
It may well be that not living up to the standards of the New Soviet
MNan does not make the Russians feel "guilty" at all: they may only
feel that they will be ostracized and rejected by the group if they do not.
This seems all the more well-founded in view of the Communist ideological emphasis on only allowing behavior, and even the expression of
ideas, that fits in with the supposed needs of the entire community. This
emphasis is very much akin to the emphasis of most primitive cultures,
according to Redfield, who attributes to it in large measure the effectiveness of public opinion in controlling their respective societies. And that
is a feeling of moral responsibility for virtually everything that happens
within the group-a notion diametrically opposed to that of individualism.
... [T]he

precivilized or "primitive" world view is a moral one
in the sense that everything that happens is perceived as being
related to the violation or maintenance of the group's ethical
code. "To primitive man the universe is spun of duty and ethical judgment." An individual whose conscience is dominated
by this moral interpretation of the universe will feel morally
responsible for every piece of good or bad fortune which happens to the group, but he will also hold all the other members
of the group responsible for it. And even individual good or
bad fortune will be attributed, not solely to the moral qualities
of the recipient, but to the virtues and vices of friends, enemies,
witches and magic helpers as well. The primitive conscience is
thus a social conscience in the sense that it shares its guilts and
anxieties with others. Different cultures will, of course, differ
in the detailed content of the moral code, methods of detecting
and punishing violators, degree of specificity in defining
crimes, etc., but the general feeling that no single individual is
wholly to blame or wholly blameless for his own or his group's
bad fortune seems to be a common feature of all of them.
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In the primitive ethos and world view, each individual's
moral failures and achievements, his moral transgressions and
conformities, are linked to his personal welfare and to the welfare of the group. And conversely, the general welfare of the
group and the private welfare of each are dependent on the
sum-total moral virtues and vices of the individual members.
Drought, disease, bad crops, poor hunting, defeat in war all
have moral significance, because they are seen in the beliefs of
many primitive cultures as punishment for misbehavior and
misconduct. Since these misfortunes are not limited to the
"guilty" individual but may affect the entire group, everyone
has a stake in enforcing conformity to the ethos; and everyone,
until "the" criminal act or person is identified, experiences guilt
feelings as he reviews his own record of past deviations from
the group code.""
Of course, in this passage Redfield speaks loosely of "guilt," but
since it is not made clear whether the primitives, in taking a furtive
glance at their own moral scoreboard, are actually placed in fear of punitive retaliation-celestial or terrestrial-or whether it is just that they
dread rejection by the group should they be found out (and the dark
forces of the spirit world, from their point of view, might be the very
agencies to blab), this may not be crucial. Information as to the possible
existence of procedures for absolving the alleged guilt feelings would
serve to narrow the field and identify the phenomena more closely. Disclosure of "'the' criminal act or person" as a method of removing everybody's guilt feelings can hardly be equated with the usual expiatory
rituals. And in any event, a belief in supernatural forces decidedly has no
place in the Soviet world view. Furthermore, even if we discount the
idea urged in some quarters that the reverent, consummately uncritical
attitude of Communists toward the "State" and their faith that sheer
benevolence must inevitably flow from unlimited, unhampered central
authority-provided it is founded on the imperishable "truths" of social
organization-is in reality nothing more than a new species of religion,
it is still well within the canons of logical inference to tentatively embrace
the following proposition: that the Soviets' insistence on conformity in
all things in the name of the common weal-the droll conviction that justice to all is best promoted through an arrangement whereby any one
individual may forthwith be shorn of the sum total of his rights if some
106. Id. at 73-74, taken from REDFIELD, The
CEEDINGS, AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY NO. 1

Primitive World View, in 91 PRO(1952).
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satrap in the service of the State declares that such individual's interests
must yield before considerations of the general welfare, and that functionary's determination of the matter is conclusively deemed to be correct-that this emphasis so dominates their outlook on political and social
life that it is at base indistinguishable from the unqualified attitude of
collective responsibility entertained by many primitive folk.
Perhaps it would not be impolitic, by way of bringing to a close this
brief and regrettably confined survey of the use of public shaming in the
Soviet Union, to speculate on what the attitude of the Russian people
themselves is toward the windows of satire. I must base my judgment
of this solely on observations made of the individuals who came up to
read the satirical posters in the Moscow railroad station as I copied information from them. My impression was that they did not regard
them as some barely tolerable enormity foisted on them by the state.
Quite on the contrary, their attitude seemed rather to be one of eager
expectancy to see who had blundered his way onto the board this time.
Such information evidently was considered a choice bit of gossip. The
facial expressions of the onlookers, however, changed abruptly when
they saw someone-obviously a Westerner-showing an abnormal interest in what they took for granted, and even taking it all down in a
notebook. This included a militiaman (civil policeman) who caused me
no little concern about what seemed at the time-it having been my first
day in the U.S.S.R.-the hardly remote possibility of being taken into
custody or at least invited to leave the premises in no uncertain terms.
He said nothing, though, and I finished my note-taking.
My industriousness evoked a strange reaction, as though an entirely
novel perspective on the matter had just been suggested to the Russiansone that likely would never have occurred in the absence of a stimulus
from the outside. The change in their expressions from ill-concealed
impishness to sulleness, almost a hurt resentfulness, seemed to say that
their thought processes at that moment were something as follows: "If
a foreigner can find such fascination in something of ours, they must
not have it where he comes from. Maybe it isn't anywhere but here.
Perhaps foreigners consider it barbaric and will tell everyone what the
Russians are like. Why do we have Okna Satir if no one else does ?"
An indication was conveyed to me that the same sensitiveness to the
opinions of others that makes the windows effective would cause the
Russians to abandon the whole business if they thought other nations
were snickering at them or considered them nekulturny ("uncultured"an extremely derogatory word in Russian these days, connoting the swinish conditions many peasants lived in some years ago) because of their
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use of such blatantly crude methods to get people to toe the line-much
in the way the Japanese responded to adverse criticism of institutions
they otherwise thought needed no justification whatever. Other instances
could be cited of a concern in the Soviet Union for foreign opinion of
certain of their endeavors.
But many engaging questions present themselves, and there are still
numerous details to be filled in. Further investigation is suggested by
the yet obscure origins of this remarkable expedient the Russians have
concocted, and in the way of providing a statistical picture of the extent
of its use throughout the country and information on possible variations
of the windows under differing conditions. Did an older Russian tradition prompt it quite as a matter of course? Perhaps it is a natural extension of the practice of calling backsliders to task publicly that has been
widely exploited in Soviet factories, for instance. Such an appraisal
seems promising, but must remain mere conjecture until more facts are
forthcoming.
A RtSUmE AND APPRAISAL

Human behavior tends to be sanctioned, either positively or negatively, by the community in which it takes place. 'In so doing, society encourages or discourages behavior in accordance with whether or not it
fits into the pattern of social ideals found in each group. Thus a degree
of conformity is secured, and, to that same degree it is inappropriate to
think of members of social groups as being brought up as free agents in
a casuistic void, that is to say, escaping immersion in an array of ethical
value judgments which, however, to all appearances, are of themselves
cultural imponderables. The group invariably takes a strong lead in developing the individual along the lines of its own particular psychological and cultural plan-but one pattern out of the ostensibly infinite number of social schemata man seems capable of adapting himself to . Evidence would appear to amply demonstrate the futility of speaking of human society without this process taking place. If there is one thing the
human animal cannot tolerate, it is leaving things alone, i.e., showing no
concern about the activities and ways of his fellows. Seen from this
vantage point, the intellectual barrenness of inquiring whether mankind
has the power to choose between social control and no social control becomes manifest. If humanity has any area of discretion it is in choosing
what measures of control it will have, according to their suitability and
according to the ends to which it wants the control to lead. This point
will be enlarged upon directly, but more attention should first be given
to the sanctions themselves.

NOTES
The most important consequence of social sanctions is that of reaffirming before the whole community the ideals which the sanctions
themselves bolster and give concrete meaning to. In everyday parlance
this reaffirming is thought of as "making an example" of those audacious enough to defy (or, rewarding those prudent enough to live up to)
norms of conduct about which the feeling of the community is sufficiently
intense to impel it to positive action. The effect upon the individuals to
whom the sanctions are applied is decidedly a secondary one, from the
social viewpoint in any case. The really salient point here is not only
that the community, by means of the sanctions, endeavors to make known
to every last member of it what behavior will not be tolerated and what
behavior it considers eminently praiseworthy, but especially that it makes
clear to all that if a particular act does not fall into the "unsanctioned"
area between the two extremes of positively sanctioned and negatively
sanctioned behavior, rather falling squarely within the province of one of
the latter two, the actor can assuredly expect to be held answerable to
the community for his conduct (or can expect tribute from the community, as the case may be).
As a rule, it is the familiarity, the propinquant relationships of small
social groups that make possible the use of those non-legal sanctions
which may be denominated "the pressures of public opinion," or shame
sanctions. The impersonal conditions of complex cultures, on the other
hand, usually require legal or authoritarian sanctions. Guilt sanctions,
however, may be employed in both simple and complex cultures, not being dependent on the face-to-face relations of the smaller groups for
their effectiveness. The lack of correlation between their use and the
size or complexity of a society is in all likelihood an indication of a
generic link between guilt phenomena and a culture's philosophical worldpicture considered as a whole, as for example, if its religious concepts
include that of a wrathful, punishing deity, it can be expected that a sense
of guilt will pervade the intellectual and psychological aspects of the culture; but if the so-called religious emphasis is on an escape from or denial of the tensions and stresses of living-as in Buddhism-then whatever emotional quirks a people living under this philosophy might have,
we would not anticipate finding among them a generalized sense of guilt
and a subconscious hankering to be punished, or at least to confess
things; and so forth. Thus, the existence of guilt sanctions and their
distribution among various culture areas would be largely fortuitous, and
not something a particular culture group would (or, perhaps in certain
cases, even could) intentionally turn to as a means of social control, in
the same sense it intentionally passes a legislative act to control human
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conduct, for example. There may be an unconscious move in this direction, though, and it is not insupportable to imagine that as a culture
grows in complexity and so must find new ways or supplementary ways
to enforce conformity that, in addition to the more obvious alternative
of introducing authoritarian techniques or legal institutions, the psychological branding of each denizen in its domain with abstract moral standards would have a distinct appeal. To the extent such guilt sanctions
achieve the end of social control, the community need turn to fewer and
less stringent legal sanctions.
The only generalization that may be put forward here is that the intimate circumstances of small communities make the pressures of public
opinion feasible as a mode of social control, thus we may expect to find
recourse to shaming procedures more frequently in them. In complex,
populous societies the conditions are less favorable for cultivating
methods of this sort, and as a rule a greater emphasis on instilling absolute standards of morality in each person, and on legal sanctions and their
concomitant enforcement agencies will be encountered there. Neither is
an unvarying rule, however. Some communities in which we would expect to find a major stress on shame sanctions take great pains to infuse
internal standards of morality into their members. These standards, if
transgressed, make the individual feel "guilty" for having "sinned" until
he confesses, atones for his sin, is punished, or until his feeling of guilt
is transferred ritually to an agency in the community existing for that
purpose. Persons in such cultures may be quite oblivious to efforts of
.the group to mock them. Similarly, other groups, which belong among
the most complex and impersonal of them, invoke with considerable success the sanctions of shame and ridicule, and the coercive power of the
reactions of others. This is always a matter of degree, though, and
does not imply in either case that other sanctions have been-or could
be-abandoned. The degree to which these counter-tendencies go against
the traditional currents, or against what situational factors such as population would seem to dictate in the way of sanctionary emphases, and the
forms in which they are manifested may vary considerably, from the
recently-emerging "other-directedness" of our own country and the of ficially endorsed doctrines of national togetherness of Soviet Communism, to the pathological sensitivity of the Japanese to how others regard
one's behavior.
If the preceding observations seem somewhat anomolous, some light
may be shed on the matter by taking into account environmental and cultural features of these societies: there are few people in the Soviet Union
who have not had a steady diet of prescribed training in social con-
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sciousness, whether they practice charity-begins-at-home privately or
not; in America rugged individualism is perhaps more of a slogan than
even the most vocal cynics have supposed-indeed, our elementary and
high schools have for some time now been permeated to the core with the
group-adjustment philosophy, so much so in fact that there appears to
be overwhelming agreement among those in a position to judge, that
academic subjects have been greatly neglected in favor of such emphasis;
the special conditions of life in Japan, from the standpoint of physical
environment, permit a degree of intimacy not ordinarily associated with
highly populated, largely urban areas, but more importantly it is the early
training in "shame" that makes the Japanese exceedingly sensitive to it.
This last point can not be re-emphasized too much, for in virtually any
society where shaming is employed in a thorough-going manner it is such
process of conditioning that is mainly accountable for the end-product
adult extravagantly responsive to manifestations of approval and disapproval in others. Intimate circumstances of life make shaming techniques effective instruments of control, but peoples in those cultures are
almost never content to let things take their natural course. They are
well aware that a lifelong process of conditioning, initiated in early childhood, redoubles the impact public opinion normally has on the individual.
Enough has been said already about the psychodynamics of shame
and guilt, and their respective onsets, that they need not be reviewed in
great detail here. It will suffice for most purposes to bear in mind only
that it is the nature of the threat posed to the individual that is the most
significant factor distinguishing shame from guilt. A great deal of the
effectiveness of both shame and guilt sanctions comes not from real, but
from irrational considerations. When a person does something he feels
guilty or ashamed about, it is not so much that he fears actual punishment or actual rejection by others (though these elements may be present
in addition, depending on the circumstances), but it is imaginary punishment and rejection, related by analogy with childhood experienceswhich left such a profound impress on the individual-that really strikes
fear in his heart.
In taking stock of the materials assembled here, with a view to following this presentation to its conclusion, an irrepressible temptation
comes over one to abandon caution to the winds and set sail on the Sea
of Indiscretion-and Presumptuousness. One wonders if anything can
be gleaned from the accumulated labors of all those who have arduously
and thoughtfully attended to the matters at hand, that might be of value
to those students of society who believe that a scientific study of man, the
psychological and social being, can create a better life for him in his rela-
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tions with his fellows, in the way that a scientific approach has been able
to improve aspects of his physical existence and material environment.
What counsel can be tendered to the hopeful designers of future Utopias?
For the school believing that ultimate answers lie in extreme points of
view I see nothing that promises to cheer their hearts. In fact, if anything emerges from the mass of data under consideration it is the irrefragable soundness of Terence's admonition for "moderation in all
things." Nothing seems to warrant the view that a society of human
beings without some form of social control lies in the years ahead, and
though it can not demonstrably be proved one way or the other, taking
this stand on the matter does not seem an especially daring thing to do
at the present time. Man has difficulties enough just in trying to cope
with the vexatious problems of social control that ever plague him, without succumbing to the temptation to idly dream them away. If the notion can only be acceded to that conflict is as much a part of man's existence as is the impermanence of his physical presence, and that this conflict, unregulated, is no more acceptable to him than utter regimentation
of his every move is acceptable to certain aspects of his psychological
being, then we can get down to particulars and perhaps decide which
compromises are desirable and which are not-rather than fritter away
our time speculating about hypothetical societies based on what man
clearly is not.
The question then is, what forms of social control should be
adopted? The answer, I fear, is more readily stated in the negative, at
least for the present writer, being congenitally beset with an express
congeries of prejudices and predilections. And I suspect also that the
upshot of these prejudices and predilections will provide little solace to
those who are disposed to think that one pattern of society is "just as
good" as another for the bare reason that all cultures have evolved
"naturally." When applied to the ways of mankind, the word natural
becomes for most purposes destitute of all practical utility. Indeed,
placing the stupendous psychological nature of man on all fours with
physiological and instinctual properties of the rest of the animal kingdom
is a remarkable commentary on the postulated logical faculties of human
beings. If anything is established by the anthropological and psychological findings of the last several decades, it is that there is almost nothing of which man is incapable when it comes to devising the life he
will live. The variations he evolves are bounded only by his imagination-which seems boundless.
The champions of prescriptive philosophy and prescriptive ethics
seem to me unquestionably to make out a good case. And this holds de-
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spite the admitted difficulties of changing human habits, either collective
or individual ones. In truth, the obstacles encountered in trying to
modify clearly undesirable behavior patterns would seem to make efforts
in this direction even more urgent for the simple reason that the person
or persons involved are manifestly helpless to get out of their predicament on their own power-even when they themselves recognize the dubious worth of their habitual ways. I would think it extraordinary, for
example, for anyone to insist that some of the extremes to which shame
sanctions have been or are now pursued are from any conceivable point
of view satisfactory for human beings anywhere, any more than the extremes to which guilt sanctions have gone or now go are satisfactory.
When they completely dominate the individual and make of him a twisted
mass of unrelenting anxiety, then the notion that a good stiff dose of social control is indispensable because all individuals in the society are
beneficiaries of it, is reduced to a macabre and depressing joke. This is
all the more apposite when regard is had for the fact that the requisite
minimum of social control is easily attained without leaving a swath of
human wreckage in its wake.
To sum up, it would seem desirable to instill some guilt sanctions in
the members of a society if but for the reason that they are self-enforcing
and require much less expenditure of effort than would legal sanctions
alone. For most categories of behavior, in point of fact, more than one
kind of sanction is presently invoked. Most people in our society would
not commit illegal acts even if the law did not apply to them, because
their internalized moral standards, or these coupled with shame sanctions,
would keep them from it. The law by and large attempts to deter, or at
least deal with, those who for one reason or another did not have these
standards so firmly ingrained in them, or who are impervious to community opinion, or who, as a result of some contrary psychological disposition, feel compelled to transgress their moral code despite the sense
of guilt that will befall them. The abnormals, of course, are another
problem. It does not follow, however, that therefore justification exists
for making a person feel guilty about things that can not be avoided,
such as antisocial or "immoral" thoughts. These are quite natural and
he should realize the fact. To make him feel guilty about them is to
forever burden him with a sense of guilt. It is sufficient that he feels
guilty enough about doing certain acts to keep from doing them. This is
all social control demands.
And what about shame? Sanctions in this grouping appear to be
more useful for bringing about the sort of conformity that results when
everyone observes approximately the same canons of etiquette. Shame can
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be used to cope with major social transgressions as well, but it, unlike
guilt, is only operative if others know one has committed the forbidden
act-unless the shame has become "internalized." Guilt, on the other
hand, hardly seems appropriate for handling minor deviations from the
accepted social niceties, since guilt feelings which would arise out of the
faux pas-from which most people could never hope to be completely immune-would constantly have to be gotten rid of through some expiatory
procedure or other if they were not to accumulate to precarious levels.
Guilt, by its very nature, seems ill-suited for this task, just as shame, because of qualities inherent in it, make it somewhat inadequate for controlling the more serious kinds of antisocial activity. But those same
qualities-the general requirement of an audience being present to witness the conduct in question-make shame a fitting agent for policing
man's direct, personal dealings with one another, and achieving a quantum of conformity in them.
Although conformability in these relatively insignificant aspects of
social behavior is not an absolute requisite of social order, few would dissent from the view that a certain amount of it is desirable, and that children should not be brought up wholly insensate to the reactions of others
in these matters. Reactions from other people seem inevitable, and to
teach the child a disregard of them is to risk his being rejected by society
and becoming something of a hermit for the rest of his days. There is
no question of maintaining social control here, but we are going beyond
this and trying to set forth the conditions of a better human existence.
The congenial association of one's fellows seems to be a deeply felt need
of the psyche, and so the child may as well learn what he must do to
partake of a normal amount of social acceptance, and avoid the loneliness
so many experience for never having sufficiently learned the minimal
requirements of interpersonal relationships.
It is a long step, however, from placing this much responsibility for
the education of the child onto shame, to either developing it to such an
intense degree that the individual feels hopelessly rejected at every little
slip, or extending it into every compartment of human behavior such
that he becomes a virtual slave to the opinions of others and suffers intrapsychically because of the lack of opportunity to express his individuality,
or because of an excess burden of "circumspection" over his every slightest act.
I submit, then, this moderate proposal for moderation to the humanists who not only believe that the limits of man's potentialities are as
yet unfathomed, but also believe that the means for achieving human
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betterment can be as important, or more important, than the end itselfand to them alone.

LEGAL HISTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL
The story of the public trial begins with the invasion of England by
William the Conqueror in 1066. Although the Norman legal system differed from that of the Anglo-Saxons, William assured his new subjects
that they were to be governed by the laws that had existed during the
reign of Edward the Confessor.' Except for a few changes in the substantive law and the establishment of a more centralized judicial system
this promise was substantially fulfilled.2 There were at least two reasons
for this policy of following the Anglo-Saxon legal customs. First, William had purported to be the lawful heir to the throne of Edward the
Confessor.' By maintaining the legal status quo there was always the
slight possibility of convincing the conquered subjects of the truth of
this assertion.' Secondly, in this newly acquired kingdom he had the
task of keeping the peace. There was nothing that resembled a public
police force, nor did there exist, at that time, any machinery by which
such a body could be established. By accepting the Anglo-Saxon customs
and laws William was able to build upon an already existing system of
law. By allowing this judicial system to remain as it was before the
conquest the problem of policing the vast new kingdom was partially
solved.
In early England the most common form of justice was carried out
by the tribe or the community.' Whenever a person committed a wrong
against another member of the community he was considered as having
1. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 67 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND]; JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 17
(5th ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as JENKS].
2. POTTER, ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1943).
3. ". . . William, on more than one occasion . . . promised to the English . . .
their 'law,' . . . the rights they held, 'on the day when King Edward . . . was alive
and dead."' JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 13 (5th ed. 1953).
4. In addition it may be recalled that the Norman law was largely unrecorded.

That which was recorded was French. The English had a relatively sound body of
recorded law. The laws of Edward the Elder, Edgar, and Cnut had been recorded.
Upon his arrival in England William found a body of customs and laws in existence.
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 65, 67.

5. "These old customary rules were the ancient custom observed by the people for
countless generations. They were administered only as such rules could be in a general
meeting, or court, composed of all the freemen of the neighborhood

cir. .upra note 2, at 7.
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